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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Analysis of customers’ complaints 1995 – 1999
Degree Msc
The dissertation is a study of Mombasa port’s customer relationship with reference to
Kenya Port Authority’s corporate direction, the customers perception of KPA’s services
and how they can be linked to the port of Mombasa through information control.
A brief look is taken at KPA’s reaction in relation to the public outcry on the decline in
traffic, with particular reference to Northern Corridor customers.  They are said to have
shifted their business interests to the neighbouring ports due, to the deplorable state of
facilities and unsatisfactory services impeding the customers from using the port.
A broad range of complaints derived from the port users meetings have been analysed as
an attempt to expose the response of KPA’s management towards the problems
experienced by the customers using the port.  Turn around time, productivity, security,
costs and other problems are perceived as the contributing factors affecting the shipping
industry in Kenya.
An in-depth analysis has been carried out on the above problems by quantifying them
using the cost benefit analysis method, from which proposals have been made for KPA
to take measures and rectify the situation.
A challenging marketing mechanism that creates a differentiated relationship with the
customers is proposed for immediate implementation by KPA to give the port a real
chance to regain its status as one of the leading hubs in Africa.
vThe concluding chapter offers recommendations for KPA’s way forward, to be
considered and implemented at all, levels of the organisation.
KEY WORDS: Competition, Customer focus, Cost benefit, Mombasa port,
Management assessment.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General overview
The time where ports could sit down and wait for cargo is long gone.  Transformation in
the shipping industry has had a tremendous impact on ports worldwide.  Today's ports are
market-oriented ports, and the market decides their future.  Ports are confronted with
challenges, as the market demands quality delivery of services at competitive prices.
Marketing of ports is something new which has changed the technological structure of the
port industry to a competitive economic environment.  Ports are no longer administrative,
but commercial entities and must prove to be financially viable.  The regional market is
changing so fast due to the economic globalisation.  The networking approach is vital for
market oriented ports since the traditional port to port routes have been replaced by
networking of routes, where different trade routes intersect and interconnect they have to
look for trade routes and not only the shipping lines.  Ports are under immense pressure
from their customers' needs and desires to respond with expensive expansion and
development projects.  Villalon (1998,82) says, " the focus should be on the needs of
customers - terminal and warehouse operators, carriers and tenants, as well as importers
and exporters who may dictate the routing of cargo through specific routes."
While ports continue to spend a great deal of time and energy trying to remain competitive
in the global market, the issue of supplying a competitive service to the customer is
2dormant in many ports.  Therefore, it is essential not only for ports to acknowledge the
basic name and address of their customers but to know how important the individual
customer is to their business and the possibility of the same customer conducting business
with other competitors instead.  Majority of ports have the tendency to believe that
customers always want one solution such as low prices while from the customer's point of
view they are more interested in flexibility.
In this aspect, the current global trend in international trade and transport envisages port
managers to assume the role of customers and determine ways and means of overcoming
their difficulties.  For instance, the flexibility of the port in assisting problems pertaining
to immigration or custom authorities.
1.2 Aim and scope of the study
The author's choice for this topic is the grief surrounding KPA's port users' meetings, on
grounds that the customers needs are being ignored unfairly with particular reference to
ICD Kisumu meetings held on a quarterly basis.  Complaints raised during the meetings
are often referred to the respective departmental heads for attention.  Despite the
attendance by a marketing officer as the secretary to the meeting, no follow up is ever
done to obtain feed back from the customers on actions taken by the concerned
departments.  More often than not, similar problems are mentioned yet again after three
months hence persistent complaints.  Ports in Europe such as the port of Malmö no longer
have port users meetings because of the fact that the participants always put forward their
own interests.  Likewise in Mombasa, as well as the inland container depots (ICDs) the
situation is worse in the sense that potential customers couldn't care less to attend the
meetings.  They could still travel to Mombasa to clear their consignments upon citing the
delays to receive them.
3This paper is designed with a focus to carry out an analysis of preparing a marketing
mechanism and commercial strategy, as a solution to the future development of Kenya
Ports Authority.  This analysis goes in parallel with a practical study of complaints derived
from the minutes of port users meetings held in Mombasa.  The high rate of complaints
from customers calls for a more systematic way of addressing the delivery of service.  The
paper is organised in three sections covered over four main chapters.
The first section is about the current developments of Mombasa port with particular
reference to its concern on the decline in transit traffic.  The aim is to study the marketing
strategy adopted by the port community to convince customers on the improved services.
The analysis on the port will be carried out to determine the performance in terms of cargo
throughput for both Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports and the cause of customers shifting
to neighbouring ports.
The second section is divided into two parts.  Chapter 3 being the first part identifies the
problems derived from the port users meetings to be studied throughout the analysis.  The
problems are classified and grouped into 5 major groups.
Chapter 4 being the second part, is to carry out an in depth analysis of the problems to
determine the evolution of the problems over a period of time.  The composition of the
complainants is equally important in the sense that customers do not only complain on
KPA's inefficiency but other state corporations are affected too.  The analysis on
persistence determines KPA's effectiveness in solving the problems.
Finally, section three, Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the analysis with a cost benefit
analysis solution.  First, select priorities, recruit the appropriate staff and then propose the
strategy to be implemented on the basis of the research.
4Chapter 6 is to draw conclusions and make recommendations to overcome the current
problems facing the customers.
The success of KPA to stand a chance of being a market oriented port is not only
dependent on its efficiency, but requires a marketing strategy that will recognise long term
relationships with customers and earn them customer ownership.  Further more, it will
enable KPA to learn its customers in a more consistent manner and provide them with a
made to measure service with fast turn around time, reduced costs and a friendly and
reliable distribution centre.
1.3 Methodology
The author was fortunate to meet the present managing director during the break in
December 1999 and attended his first meeting with the customers.  Contacts were made
with the senior executives of Kenya Ports Authority in Mombasa, Nairobi, Kisumu and
Kampala to obtain the relevant data pertaining to the general information on the port and
the port users meetings.  Importers and exporters based in Kampala were interviewed with
the intention of determining their reasons for shifting their business priorities to the port of
Dar es Salaam.  Relevant books and articles were researched regarding the evolution of
ports, which have gone hand in hand with rapid growth of the economy.  A substantial
amount of data was obtained from the Internet on the fast changing pace of the market
focus, in relation to customers' requirements.  Lecture notes conferred at the World
Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden, and practical experiences gathered from field trips
conducted during the 17 months of study have also been incorporated to bring about the
success of this study.
5CHAPTER 2
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF MOMBASA PORT
2.1 Introduction
The aim of the present chapter is the study of KPA's market strategy used in meeting the
customers ever changing demands with particular reference to Northern Corridor.
Analysis of the performance for Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports will be carried out to
determine the cause of shifting to neighbouring ports.
2.2 Kenya Ports Authority’s marketing strategy
KPA does not have a well-defined marketing strategy but it ensures customer care
services by co-ordinating its activities on a daily basis in liaison with the port users.
2.2.1 Port users’ meetings
Initially, the authority conducted an advisory productivity council meeting under the
chairmanship of the managing director.  The purpose of this meeting was for the
authority to review and analyse its performance in response to changes of demand from
customers.  Ideally, this meeting was supposed to be conducted on monthly basis, but on
going through the minutes illustrated in Appendix C it is noted that no proper system
was followed to schedule the meetings.  However it has now been replaced by the
consultative meeting on movement of transit cargo along the northern corridor, with
effect from 5th March 1999.  A similar meeting is also conducted at the inland container
6depots chaired by the manager in charge of the depots, with the objective to strengthen
the relationship and harmonise co-operation between the port and its users.  The
meetings also serve as familiarisation sessions in those problems experienced by
shipping lines; shippers and potential customers are also discussed.
The newly instituted consultative meeting at the port is on a monthly basis for all
stakeholders, to help iron out difficulties associated with the movement of transit cargo
along the northern corridor.  This meeting has been initiated following persistent
complaints from the port users who have now turned to the Tanzanian port citing
inefficiency, red tape, corruption and dilapidated infrastructure at Mombasa in
particular, Uganda coffee exporters and some major cargo handling companies.  As at
December 1999, four consecutive consultative monthly meetings had taken place.
The consultative group includes senior officers from Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya
Railways Corporation, Uganda Railways Corporation, Kenya Revenue Authority,
Uganda Revenue Authority, Uganda Clearing and Forwarding Association, Kenya
International Freight and Forwarding Association, Kenya Shipping Agency, permanent
Secretariat of the Transit Transport and Kenya Police under the chairmanship of
Commissioner General of Kenya Revenue Authority.  Issues raised in this meeting
assume the priority they deserve and have been addressed with all the keenness.  The
meeting takes place either in the morning or afternoon for approximately 4 hours.
2.2.2 The impact of symposiums
In December 1999, the Kenya Ports Authority was represented at a high-level sub
regional symposium held in a luxurious hotel in Mombasa for 3 days, on transit transport
policies and operations.  The meeting was organised by the permanent secretariat of the
Transit Transport Co-ordination Authority of the Northern Corridor, an organisation that
7brings together the five principle users of the port of Mombasa namely Kenya, Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The symposium was also attended by the following participants as illustrated below:
• The ministers, permanent secretaries and other relevant senior government officials
in the Ministries of Transport, Public Works and Trade, as well as other relevant
state institutions in the five member states;
• Senior officials from the offices of the revenue authorities in the member States;
• Senior officials from the security agents such as police and the Central Investigation
Department;
• Senior executives  from the Railway administrations;
• Senior managers from the Association of Road Transport;
• Senior managers from clearing and forwarding agencies;
• Senior managers from insurance and banking institutions providing financial
services to transit transport operators;
• Senior managers from relevant export and import companies;
• Senior managers from international shipping agencies including other related
agencies involved in the control of export and import companies;
• Senior managers from public information agencies and companies;
• Senior representatives from relevant United Nations agencies and other relevant
international and regional organisation.
Basic technical reports were presented to facilitate the deliberations of the symposium
covering the following aspects:
• An overview of the current transit transport situation in the sub region;
• Issues related to port facilities, management and operations and the development
and management of dry ports;
8• Customs transit procedures and regulations;
• Rail transit traffic and road transit traffic including the enforcement of axle load
limits.
The symposium was a unique opportunity to attract all stake holders from the public
and private sectors involved in activities that are directly or indirectly relevant to the
development of the transit traffic operations along the Northern Corridor.  It fostered
regional co-operation and also provided a forum for the stakeholders to express their
views and explain their problems to the decision-makers.
2.2.3  KPA's liaison office
KPA has extended its services by establishing a liaison office in Kampala to cater for
Uganda and the Great Lakes region market.  An interview with KPA's resident
representative based in Kampala, Mboya, I (1999, December) revealed the following:
The office opened its doors on the 1st December 1996, and was officially commissioned
on the 8th October 1997.  Since its inception, the Kampala office has done a great deal in
updating port users on latest developments at the port, for example on information about
the discharging and loading vessels and dates of arrivals.  The office serves as a
functional arm of the port users and can always be reached within 24 hours.  Claims can
now be lodged through this office unlike in the past, when follow up of claims proved to
be difficult due to lack and flow of information and communication.  Previously,
customers had experienced problems for paying for charges that are not related to KPA
by various stakeholders, but through this office, they are now conversant with
export/import shipping procedures and the port tariffs that are currently on concession.
Mboya further said that the Kampala office has enhanced the relationship between
Kenya Ports Authority management and the port users from the region, and has also
9helped to boost trade by participating in the annual Uganda International Trade Fare.  He
adds that the office has helped in updating customers on what steps Kenya Ports
Authority has taken to improve efficiency at the port, particularly at this time with a lot
of speculation on loss of traffic to Dar es salaam.  Consultative meetings are held in
conjunction with the Kenya Railways, Uganda Railways, shipping representatives and
forwarding agents to chart out the strategies on where improvements can be done to
match the port users demands.  The office also works in close liaison with Kenya’s
commercial attaché to Uganda in promoting business between Kenya and Uganda,
which has proved beneficial to the business community using the port of Mombasa.  The
office has also harmonised the complaints, which were initially being channelled to the
High Commissioner.
The authority has intentions to establish other liaison offices in Kigali and Bujumbura to
educate shippers in cargo documentation and port operations, in an effort to promote
regional economic co-operation and integration.
2.2.4 KPA's Objectives.
The two noble objectives that KPA is concerned with in order to facilitate international
and national maritime trade in the most efficient manner are, the reduction of cargo
dwell time in the port and the minimisation of ships working time in the port.  Kenya’s
vision for the port of Mombasa is calls for a restructured organisation that will entail a
highly motivated labour force, and a more commercially oriented management.  The
way ahead for KPA is to have a network link with overseas ports and neighbouring ports
in order to respond quickly to fast moving global market developments.  KPA’s mission
is to develop the port’s infrastructure at the most economically and financially viable
cost to operators and to ensure that it provides high quality, timely and cost efficient
services to the customers.
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2.3 Challenges that face the port of Mombasa.
Kenya Ports Authority starts the 21st century with major challenges ahead of it, the
toughest being marketing to attract more business through the port and keep the existing
traffic too.  One of the major challenges facing KPA is the port’s performance levels and
its productivity as it has a rated capacity to handle 22 million tonnes per year.
Francou (2000) of the World Maritime University provides information that,
In order to improve the port performance and to cope with the quick
development of the shipping industry, there is need to identify indicators to
measure how the port operations can be done better.  2/3 of the total maritime
cost happen in the ports, mainly wharfage, handling and storage operations hence
the port should be a low cost provider by reducing its operational costs.  Turn
around time should be short in terms of total cost per tonne handled.
Although KPA envisages the possibility of being a world class landlord port handling a
minimum of 9.8 million tonnes by the year 2000, its present utilisation is still low at
45%.
In recent years, the port of Mombasa has been faced with numerous problems, which
have adversely affected its operational performance.  This aspect has also led the
shipping fraternity especially importers from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of Congo to take up the option of using the port of Dar es Salaam
in Tanzania and Durban in South Africa.  These problems are attributable to high costs,
poor services, low efficiency and unreliability as expressed by the customers, whose
details will be elaborated in the next chapter.  However, the above factors are considered
symptoms of a problem rather than causes.
11
2.3.1 Position of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports.
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports are situated in East Africa along the Indian Ocean.
(See map attached in appendix A).  For a while the two ports have been resistant to
change but today the environment in these ports seems to have changed due to
globalisation.  Almazan & Mundy (2000) comments on the landmark decision by the
port of Dar es Salaam to lease its container terminal on concession to a Manila-based
International Container Terminal Services in conjunction with its Tanzanian partner,
Vertex Financial Services for a period of 10 years.  Prior, to this the two ports have
experienced similar operational problems such as cumbersome documentation
procedures, backlog of boxes not cleared hence constant congestion at the terminals, and
ships not calling the ports directly.  Critchton, (1999,41) confirms that, " CMBT which
used to run a multipurpose North Europe/East Africa service abandoned it due to poor
port conditions in East Africa.  Instead, it offered a service to Dar es Salaam via Durban,
pre-carrying on Europe/South Africa ships".  Turn around time is between 4 to 5 days
compared to the standard time in other ports, which is 2 days.  The two ports are not
fully automated apart from having had new computerised billing systems installed in the
revenue departments respectively.  However, comparison of the two ports is not the best
scenario to assess the current situation at the port of Mombasa.  KPA's main concern
should be concentrated on the decline of traffic with particular reference to transit
traffic.
2.4 Port throughput.
Through put is the volume of traffic passing through the port that also acts as a measure
portraying the functions and the relative importance of a port, and a reflection of the
combined effects of the various factors influencing port operations.  This study will only
analyse data for 1991 – 1998, since the latest statistics for the port are not available.
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2.4.1 Dry cargo traffic.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the dry cargo traffic through the ports of Mombasa and Dar es
Salaam respectively.  The total throughput of Mombasa port rose from 7.10 million tons
in 1991 to 8.46 million tons in 1998.  The highest recorded throughput was in 1996 with
a record of 8.58 million tons with an average throughput of 8.05 million tons.  The port
operations have been dominated by imports with an average share for the period of 73 %
while 30 % of the imports is comprised of transit traffic.
Table 1.  Dry cargo traffic - port of Mombasa ('000 Tonnes).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Imports 5040 4827 4288 5182 4259 3700 5454 5648
Exports 1535 1854 2503 1391 1722 2041 1461 1680
Transit 528 1210 1131 1706 1938 2835 1344 1127
Total traffic 7103 7891 7922 8279 7919 8576 8259 8455
% change of total traffic 0 11 0 5 -4 8 -4 2
                                                                                                       Source: Annual Bulletin of Port Statistics 1998
             Figure 1.  Dry cargo traffic - Mombasa port
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Table 2.  Dry cargo traffic-port of Dar es Salaam ('000 Tonnes).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Imports 564 678 855 795 836 645 947 901
Exports 266 289 314 252 357 311 294 315
Transit 1075 1379 1284 1024 891 706 596 541
Total traffic 1905 2346 2453 2071 2084 1662 1837 1757
% change of total traffic 0 23 5 -16 1 -20 11 -4
                                                                                                 Source: Tanzania Harbours Authority Annual Report, 1998
During the same period, the port of Dar es Salaam recorded the highest throughput of
2.45 million tons in 1993 with an average throughput of 2.02 million tons.  The volume
is also dominated by imports with an average share for the period of 64 % while 120 %
of the imports is comprised of transit traffic.
 Figure 2.  Dry cargo traffic - Dar es Salaam port
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2.4.2 Container traffic
The port of Mombasa is the main container port in the region serving the landlocked
countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well
as Kenya itself.  Container traffic rose from 135,540 twenty feet equivalent units
(TEUS) in 1991 to 248,451 by 1998 indicating a growth rate of 8.13 %.  The increase in
box throughput has been attributed to containerisation of general cargo as illustrated in
table 3.
Table 3.  Container traffic-port of Mombasa (TEUS).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Full 107584 107645 112646 126633 153748 165752 172742 183989
Empty 27956 27679 31491 33660 46789 51276 57956 64462
Total traffic 135540 135324 144137 160293 200537 217028 230698 248451
% change of total traffic 0 0 7 11 25 8 6 8
                                                                                                                                         Source: Annual Bulletin of Port Statistics 1998.
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The port of Dar es Salaam also shares the same hinterland as the port of Mombasa.
Table 4 illustrates between 1991 and 1998 the port recorded a growth rate of 4.88 %.
The share of empty containers to the total traffic is relatively high.  The average in both
ports had a record of 23 % and 22 % respectively, the latter being Dar es Salaam port.
This scenario indicates the imbalance of trade.
Table 4.Container traffic- port of Dar es Salaam (TEUS).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Full 60832 67963 74327 75407 73082 69382 71198 83916
Empty 15564 18892 23466 20480 21027 24246 27472 26426
Total traffic 76396 86855 97793 95887 94109 93628 98670 110342
% change 0 14 13 -2 -2 -1 5 12
                                                                                                                       Source: Tanzania Harbours Authority Annual Report, 19
                              Figure 4.  Container traffic – Dar es Salaam port.
2.4.3 Transit traffic
Today, transit traffic is of major concern to the port of Mombasa.  About 18.3 % of
Mombasa's traffic comprises of transit cargo with Uganda accounting for 50 %, Burundi
is 1.5 %, Rwanda is 17.5 % and D.R. of Congo is 9.4 % of the transit traffic.  As
illustrated in table 5 the highest recorded throughput of 2.83 million tons was in 1996
the with a share contribution of 33 % of the total cargo throughput.  However, since
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1996 share of transit traffic has considerably dropped to 16.2 % in 1997 and 13.3 % in
1998 respectively.  The port of Mombasa is speculated to have lost a substantial amount
of this trade to the port of Dar es Salaam.
Table 5.  Transit traffic - port of Mombasa (‘000 Tonnes).
Particulars 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Uganda Imports 154 321 336 711 910 962 595 651
Exports 149 146 146 205 146 250 277 191
Total 303 467 482 916 1056 1212 872 842
Tanzania Imports 16 10 17 134 76 344 65 41
Exports 2 5 7 9 16 19 24 17
Total 18 15 24 143 92 363 89 58
Burundi Imports 11 33 18 35 45 12 0 1
Exports 2 9 3 1 3 0 0 0
Total 13 42 21 36 48 12 0 1
Rwanda Imports 54 77 56 169 475 770 155 83
Exports 48 37 68 9 19 26 12 11
Total 102 114 124 178 494 796 167 94
Sudan Imports 2 35 36 70 26 11 20 52
Exports 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Total 2 35 36 70 26 12 20 52
D.R.  Congo Imports 14 80 44 226 116 259 94 43
Exports 56 31 34 34 27 25 12 17
Total 70 111 78 260 143 284 106 60
Others Imports 20 426 347 93 78 144 44 18
Exports 0 0 19 10 1 12 46 2
Total 20 426 366 103 79 156 90 20
Total Imports 271 982 854 1438 1726 2502 973 889
Total Exports 257 228 277 268 212 333 371 238
Total Traffic 528 1210 1131 1706 1938 2835 1344 1127
%change total traffic 0 129 -7 51 14 46 -53 -16
                                                                                                                                 Source: Annual Bulletin of Port Statistics 1998
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   Figure 5.  Transit traffic – Mombasa port
At Dar es salaam, between 1991 and 1998 transit cargo was 7.50 million tons, which
accounted for 46.5 % of its total throughput.  Uganda accounts for 5.1 %, Burundi is 13
%, Rwanda is 9.7 % and D.R.  of Congo is 11.7 % of the transit traffic.  From figure and
table 6 there is an indication that since 1991 to 1994 the share contribution was above 50
% but declined thereafter to 31 % as recorded in 1998.
       Figure 6. Transit traffic – Dar es Salaam port
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Table 6.  Transit traffic- port of Dar es Salaam (‘000 Tonnes).
Particulars 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Uganda Imports 12 3 3 13 51 30 63 40
Exports 32 14 14 32 5 42 21 12
Total 44 17 17 45 56 72 84 52
Burundi Imports 103 77 121 212 134 46 32 31
Exports 41 47 42 37 38 19 0 0
Total 144 124 163 249 172 65 32 31
Rwanda Imports 47 46 159 99 97 92 103 52
Exports 0 0 0 1 6 12 5 9
Total 47 46 159 100 103 104 108 61
D.R.  Congo Imports 46 33 47 49 98 60 65 60
Exports 100 61 89 23 27 93 21 3
Total 146 94 136 72 125 153 86 63
Kenya Imports 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
Others Imports 256 679 383 201 131 92 81.00 143
Exports 438 419 426 356 304 220 203.00 191
Total 694 1098 809 557 435 312 284 334
Total Imports 464 838 713 575 511 320 346 326
Total Exports 611 541 571 449 380 386 250 215
Total traffic 1,075 1,379 1,284 1,024 891 706 596 541
% of total traffic 0 28 -7 -20 -13 -21 -16 -9
                                                                Source: Tanzania Harbours Authority Annual Report, 1998
There is potential growth for transit traffic given the high percentage of 30 % registered
in 1996 at Mombasa and 60 % in 1992 at Dar es Salaam respectively.  However, the
continued decline in both ports since 1996 may reflect on problems affecting the
Northern Corridor.  The Kenyan economy has slowed down; hence the decline in
imports from Europe. Far East and South Africa while the decline in exports due to the
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extreme bad weather in 1998, which affected the agricultural exports, was felt. Tanzania
also suffered from similar economic crisis
2.5 Operational constraints
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(1995, p.5) survey, “when it comes to problems experienced by the port users, the
infrastructure and the cargo handling equipment are often the prime elements considered
to be at fault.  If ports have the right infrastructure and necessary equipment, the cause
of the problems may be the lack of appropriate management or of modern management
know how.” However, KPA has continually upgraded its facilities, acquired more
equipment and rehabilitated the old ones to handle cargo more efficiently and
effectively.  The same sentiments are also shared in the article, Sudan, Uganda peace
deal a boon for port (2000), Mudavadi, the Kenyan Minister for Information, Transport
and Communication says that, “no effort should be spared to ensure that the port
infrastructure and operations remain at a leading pace in order to continue attracting the
business of the sub region.”
2.6 Conclusion
In essence, the two ports are different in a number of aspects, thus not easy to compare
their performances despite the general decline in traffic.  Therefore, much as KPA
strives to value its customers by offering quality services, it is under obligation to treat
the problems to be addressed in the next chapter with utmost seriousness by correlating
its performance levels and the various facilities.
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CHAPTER 3
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS
3.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter, is to identify the problems derived from the port
users meeting covering the period from May 1995 to November 1999 as illustrated in
Appendix C.  The classification of these problems is vital for the purpose of the analysis
to be studied in the next chapter.
3.2 Classification of the problems
These problems are classified and grouped in 5 major groups as will be seen later in the
chapter.  On going through Appendix C, one will note that not all problems originate
from KPA despite the hue and cry common among many port users.  There are also
problems related to Kenya Railways Corporation, Kenya Revenue Authority and Kenya
Police etc.  The problems have again been divided into 5 major groups as illustrated by
the following tables:
3.2.1 Problem Group 1: Turn around time
The problems pertaining to turn around time illustrated in table 7, are KPA's major
stumbling block on the movement of transit cargo along the northern corridor hence the
loss of business to the port of Dar-es-Salaam.  This problem has resulted to longer turn
round time and higher costs for the customers.  The factors contributing to this problem
are as follows:
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Table 7.  Problems pertaining to turn around time.
Code Problem Code Problem
UC Undocumented containers SD Stripping delays
RL Railing of containers LS Lack of storage space
DP Documentation procedures TC Tracing containers
OD Operational documents
                                                                                                 Source: Appendix C
3.2.1.1 Port procedures and documentation.
In any port environment, the movement of ships and cargoes involve a number of
procedures, each involving a number of actors.  Most of the procedures involve
commercial relationships, administrative functions and government institutions that are
outside the scope of the port authority.  Due to the financial and legal liabilities
involved, 99% of port procedures require documents of some kind.  The use of different
documents required by the port procedures, means that more time is spent sometimes
inside or outside the port community to prepare them, which frequently consists of
copying information from one document to another to present it in a different way.
The slow, cumbersome and haphazard administrative procedures involving KPA, KRA,
KRC, the ignorance and incompetence of some of the clearing and forwarding agents
and KPP has always been blamed for delays in moving cargo through the port.
Employees of the Swiss Procurement Company (SWIPCO), an agency contracted by the
government to audit imports interfere with port/clearing operations by verifying the
value of goods already determined by pre-shipment inspection companies.  The
importers are compelled to pay additional money, which ends up in individual pockets,
thus encouraging corruption.  This system is rampant at the motor vehicle section, hence
the delay to obtain motor vehicle inspection reports.
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KPA lacks a proper system of handling claims, or rather complicates issues when it
comes to compensating the port users.  Under normal circumstances, claims will be
repudiated due to the delays encountered by the shipper to obtain the out turn reports,
motor vehicle inspection reports and short landing certificates.  Apparently in the article,
Sh40m cost of port cargo theft (1999), it is believed that KPA pays large sums of money
as compensation for lost goods.  The documentation crisis at the port has eased up lately
as a result of the new computerised billing system.  However, the new system is
expected to eradicate the problems but the port users still have to go through many
repetitive checks and reconciliation on documents, as well as physical verification
before the actual release of cargo to the consignee.  Unlike the Southern Corridor, the
requirement by KRA for shippers to execute a customs bond on transit traffic is also a
bottleneck that increases the cost of transiting through the Northern Corridor.  The
working hours are not harmonised in such a way that the three teams, KPA, KRA and
KPP can work together.  A typical example for documentation procedures for transit
cargo (Northern corridor) passing through the Mombasa port requires at least 25
different steps with an impressive volume of stamps and numbers affixed on documents.
As mentioned earlier the impact of the whole system results in the wastage of time and
resources, and reduces the competitiveness of the port.
3.2.1.2 Undocumented containers
Delays in lodging the relevant documents for the containers by the shippers is a major
concern in terms of cost and time factors for the authority, resulting in longer cargo
dwell time.  In the article, What Ails Clearing and Forwarding in Kenya? (1998), it is
noted that the number of undocumented containers lying in the port between May and
June 1998 increased up from 1,800 to 3,400.  KPA is unable to operate commercially as
is expected by the port users, thus straining storage capacity for the containers that do
not attract any storage charges.  The situation has also frustrated KPA's efforts aimed at
making port operations more fluid.
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3.2.1.3 Lack of storage space
The port is congested as a result of back log of undelivered cargo that builds up, when
the rate at which the cargo is discharged from ships into the port area is higher than the
rate which the cargo is delivered out.  The customs officers have not been able to
perform as expected, due to the limited space in the working areas and open storage.
Mechanical equipment moving cargo between ship's side and storage on land cannot
move freely, turn round is slowed and the discharge of ships is affected, the chance of
landed cargo being over stored, and possibly damaged is increased.
3.2.1.4 Pier to pier operations
The above operations are related to the stripping or stuffing of containers, and are
carried out in an open area.  Some of the delays encountered such as the rains are
beyond KPA's control.  The delays are normally caused by lack of stripping tallies.
3.2.1.5 Railing of containers
Kenya Railways has not been able to supply block train services as agreed with the
shipping lines and KPA due to insufficient wagon availability.  The slow cargo off take
as the rail and road links are often unable to cope has resulted in longer dwell times
estimated at 22 days compared to the projected 10 days.  A number of containers have
been diverted to rail as most countries have enhanced their axle load control
mechanisms.  However, this caused a lot of problems as rail transport did not have the
capacity to cope with a sudden increase of traffic resulting to 28 days transit time from
Mombasa to Kampala.  One of the key contributing factors to the delay in the movement
of rail borne transit cargo was the requirement of tally sheet which was later withdrawn
and replaced by a packing declaration to be signed by the agents.  Table 8 illustrates the
duration to clear and transport transit cargo by rail from both the ports of Mombasa and
Dar-es -Salaam to final destination in Kampala.
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Table 8.  Comparison of transit time
Port of Mombasa Port of Dar es Salaam
Number of days Number of days
Long room processing  (KRA) 5 The meeting was
KPA Revenue office  (KPA) 2 informed that the time
Verification  (KRA & KPA) 4 it took transit cargo to
Loading  (KPA & KRC) 3 be cleared at
Mombasa - Malaba  (KRC) 3 Dar es Salaam and
Delays in Malaba (KRA&KRC) 3 transported by rail
Delays in Tororo  (URC) 3 to Kampala averaged
Tororo - Kampala  (URC) 2 fifteen (15) days
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS 28 DAYS 15 DAYS
                                                                                                                           Source: Minutes of Consultative Meeting 1999.
3.2.2 Problem Group 2: Productivity
Table 9.  Problems pertaining to productivity
Code Problem Code Problem
PF Port facilities LAE Low availability of equipment
SL Shortage of labour SW Supply of wagons
CK Misplacement of keys CO Customs officers
RF Reefer facilities
                                                                                                       Source: Appendix C
The port productivity in the past was below average due to the congestion of port
facilities, inadequate equipment and the lack of strategic planning hence low
competitiveness of the port.  Due to recent changes in handling techniques as well as
technological progress, numerous port budgets are now devoted to the purchasing, the
operating and the maintenance of handling equipment.  In this aspect, table 10 illustrates
that KPA's budget in mechanical and electrical sections is relatively high due to hard
currency rendering the high expenditure on maintenance being between 17 % - 25 % of
the budget allocation.  Likewise expenditure on maintenance in the port of Tanjung
Priok in Jakarta is between 9 % - 14 %.  However, Sen (2000) of Malta Freeport
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Corporation recommends that the cost of maintenance should not exceed 3 % of the
budgeted volume of business.
Table 10.  Mechanical and electrical engineering sections.
Year BUDGET
ALLOCATION US$
MAINTENANCE
EXPENDITURE US$
CURRENT
STAFF
1994 / 95 10,254,206 2,062,840 Management - 83
1995 / 96 10,415,019 2,120,102
1996 / 97 10,463,938 1,807,206 Union staff - 397
1997 / 98 10,528,415 2,122,758
1998 / 99 10,435,650 2,405,408
1999 / 00 4,481,655 1,129,457
                                                                                                                         Source: Port Annual Budget Bulletin 1999.
3.2.2.1 Equipment availability and efficiency
KPA has an old inventory of equipment, whose performance has been low on account of
age.  Table 11 illustrates the position of the handling appliances/equipment with an
exception of four reach stackers acquired in early 1999.  3 ship to shore gantry cranes
(SSGs) were delivered in December 1982 and commissioned in January 1983, 1 SSG
was assembled in Mombasa in 1990 and 7 rail tyred gantry cranes (RTGs) were bought
in 1985 respectively.  However, the personal assistant to the Managing Director, Ndua
(1999 December) comments that the 4 SSGs have never been in service simultaneously.
He further confirms the lack of maintenance resulting to poor availability levels: 46 %
for RTGs against a target of 65 % and 65 % for SSGs against expected 90 %.  One way
to reduce time in port is to increase the quantity and quality of port equipment that is
available to work a vessel simultaneously.  The overall efficiency of the port has
adversely been affected due the repetitive occurrence of equipment break down.
The Executive Secretary of the Transit Transport Co-ordination Authority of the
Northern Corridor, Kanamugire (1999, June) indicates that,
26
Lack of spare parts is a major stumbling block to the maintenance of the old
equipment.  The ones whose spare parts are available also delay in being
serviced due to lengthy tendering procedures for maintenance contracts.  This
situation increases the equipment’s down time leading to vessel delays and
longer cargo dwell time of which have occasionally degenerated in port
congestion.
He continues to say that,
KPA’s inventory is unable to cope with the demand for general cargo handling
operations such as shore handling, transfer of cargo from quays to warehouses
and yards as well as within yards and delivery onto trucks and rail wagons.  The
old SSG cranes have been one of the major drawbacks on productivity at the
container terminal.  The poor conditions of the equipment have occasionally
compelled the users of the northern corridor to pay for delay surcharges imposed
by the shipping industry.  Despite the agreement on productivity guarantee
between KPA and the shipping lines on the performance of SSG’s, there has
never been a record of more than 200 moves per day with an exception of the
month of March 1998, with a record of 150 to 170 moves per day.
Customs clearance operations at Malaba are normally disrupted due to frequent power
black outs.  Lack of cargo handling equipment has also hampered the return of railway
wagons from Kampala to Mombasa.
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Table 11.  Handling appliances
(a) Container Terminal
No. Type of Appliances Capacity
4 ship-to-shore gantry cranes 40 tonnes
11 rubber tyred gantry cranes 40 tonnes
2 rail mounted gantry cranes 40 tonnes
7 toploaders 40 tonnes
3 Prime movers - PPMs 40 tonnes
64 Tugmasters and 6 shunters
(b) General Cargo Berths
53 Portal electrical travelling cranes 3-20 tonnes
9 portal electrical fixed cranes 2-5 tonnes
19 electrical fixed cranes 1-15 tonnes
43 mobile cranes 5-40 tonnes
3 multi-purpose forklift trucks 40 tonnes
2 overhead belt conveyors for bulk soda ash 110 tonnes/hr
                                                                   Source: Annual Bulletin of Port Statistics 1998
The current performance of Mombasa port in comparison to other ports in Europe in
1991 except for the port of Aarhus, as illustrated in figure 7 is an indication of poor
productivity due to lack of maintenance.  The current performance of the port of Aarhus
has enabled it attain the 2nd position in the Scandinavian region.
                   Figure 7.  Average container movements per gantry per shift.
                 Source: Marconsult SpA, Genoa as given in Hinterland 16 (1), 1994, 9.
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3.2.2.2 Labour productivity
Despite the cash incentives and bonuses paid only to operations and technical staff, as
motivation to achieve higher productivity, KPA's average performance is only 23.43
tonnes a day.  However, Horck, (2000) of the World Maritime University emphasises on
UNCTAD's recommended productivity of 640 tonnes a day that cannot be compared to
KPA’S performance.  The poor relationship between the stevedores and management
staff has seriously affected KPA's productivity.
The system does not adequately reward hard work, for instance the staff processing the
documents in the Revenue section.  No actions are taken on staff neither for non-
performance nor to enforce accountability.  The issue of staff misplacing car keys
causing delays is a clear indication of poor supervision and laxity in KPA staff.
The situation at Kenya Railways is no better either.  Lack of discipline in KRA staff has
been observed.  The article, New Steps Boost KR Cargo Business (2000) the former
Kenya Railways Managing Director, Nyamunga, E, says that, "during the days of
monopoly, we became relaxed as we waited for customers to come to us instead of
approaching them.  Because of the laxity they never bothered to repair wagons and
containers." Delays have also been caused at Malaba for Kampala bound train services
due to frequent absence of KRC personnel from their place of work.
KRA personnel too cause delays at Malaba up to 9 hours owing to the slow clearance.
KRA staff mostly works during office hours thus unavailable after normal office hours
and during weekends.
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3.2.2.3 Berthing delays
In the last two years, vessels calling at the Mombasa container terminal have incurred
heavy losses due to delays encountered, following the rehabilitation of the container
yard and reconstruction of the two berths (Nos16 and 17).  There was also repair work of
the fenders at berth No 18 which is too small for most vessels that call at the port.  The
ships operations were constrained due to the civil works at the container terminal.
Container vessels were then allocated to conventional berths (Nos13 and 14) which have
no proper quay side and back up equipment for container operations.  The average
waiting time for a berth of a container ship during December 1997 was 60 hours as
illustrated in Appendix B.
3.2.3 Problem Group 3: Security
Security for cargo at the port of Mombasa has been a major challenge.  Millions of
shillings worth of cargo has been reported stolen from the port every year despite the
presence of a fully-fledged police division.
Table 12.  Problems pertaining to security.
Code Problem Code Problem
RC Rail borne cargo SDC Security on dual carriage
PS Port security PE Police escort
EC Excessive checks
                                                                                                                            Source: Appendix C
It is believed that some port security officers and an established ring of cargo thieves are
masterminding these thefts, a factor, which is seen to be encouraging the theft of parts of
all sorts of machinery.  A lasting solution to the problem does not seem to be in sight
and the port is no doubt losing business to rival ports in the region.  A number of cases
were noted where containers were pilfered while on wagons in the port.  There were also
incidences of greasing railway tracks to slow down the train movement to ease up the
pilferage of containers outside the port.
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One of the key contributory factors to the increase of cargo theft is the introduction of
strict measures by the government to curb diversion of transit goods from the port.  The
syndicate has now resorted to out right theft of cargo from the port hence potential port
users particularly Ugandan businessmen are discouraged and have lost confidence in the
port services.  The security of transit cargo in the port is one of the areas where the
stakeholders have called for changes.  The following weaknesses have been observed as
the main causes of this situation:
• Inappropriate handling causing damage to cargo;
• Verification of containers exposing their content and leading to identifications and
targeting high value cargo;
• Inadequate stevedores to handle cargo out of vessels leading to overtime work under
lower security conditions;
• Cumbersome procedures delaying cargo within the port and creating congested areas
(trucks delivering cargo out of the port) at the exit gates;
• Laxity in port security personnel resulting in a lot of unauthorised persons entering
the port.
• Delays on the movement of transit cargo to the border points were caused due to
laxity Kenya police force.
3.2.4 Problem Group 4: Cost
Table 13.  Problems pertaining to cost.
Code Problem Code Problem
PC Penalty charges KL Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate
Service Levy
ANT Application of new tariff THC Terminal handling charges
CSD Cost of shipping documents COC Customs overtime costs
RT Rail Tariff
                                                                                                                                                          Source: Appendix C
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3.2.4.1 Port charges
An expensive port is a port offering a poor quality of services, and not necessarily high
tariffs.  The charges in the port of Mombasa are determined by the 1995 tariff, based
more closely on the services provided by KPA and less on the value of cargo being
moved.  The port users experience difficulties in interpreting the tariff which is
denominated in United States dollar (US$) while, the port charges are actually paid in
Kenya shillings.  As Figure 8 illustrates, KPA's container tariffs are relatively high in
comparison to other ports around the world.  However, the port users have no option but
to comply with the tariff rates due to the monopolistic position of KPA.  In most cases
the shippers pass on these costs to the customers, as they are more concerned about the
port in delivering their goods quickly, rather than cost.
                    Figure 8.  Comparative Container Charges1
                                     1 Report done by Hickling Corporation in association with Mwaniki Associates Consultants
for KPA, 1995.
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3.2.4.2 Terminal handling charges (THC)
Some shipping agents are still charging their clients' terminal handling charges, which
contributes to the cost of shipping through the port of Mombasa.  The port users
complained that terminal handling charges of US$ 70 per container paid by the users of
the northern corridor was making the port of Mombasa more expensive compared to the
port of Dar-es-Salaam.
3.2.4.3 KRC Tariff rates
Castellano, T (1999, July), Managing Director of Oceanfreight (K) Ltd confirms that
KRC's tariff for transportation of containerised traffic between Mombasa and Malaba is
US$ 930, while Tanzania Railways Corportation (TRC's) tariff between Dar es Salaam
and Mwanza is US$ 724.  However, from Malaba to Kampala and from Mwanza to
Kampala the tariff is uniform at US$ 429.  Therefore Northern Corridor route is more
expensive by US$ 206 hence the diversion of Uganda traffic to Dar es Salaam port.
3.2.4.4 KRA Tariff rates
The port users complained of high customs overtime cost charged per truck carrying
export cargo from Uganda at the Malaba border.  KRA also charges high warehouse
rents at the rate of US$ 30 per day for a 20-ft container and US$ 60 for a 40-ft container.
3.2.5 Problem Group 5: Others
The following issues are not related to problems pertaining to the movement of cargo
but were raised in the consultative meeting.
Table 14.  Problems pertaining to others.
Code Problem Code Problem
TB Telephone booths HCP Harassment of cruise ship passengers
                                                                                                            Source: Appendix C
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3.2.5.1 Telephone services
Majority of the port users found it difficult to communicate to their offices while at the
port due to insufficient telecommunication facilities in the port.
3.2.5.2 Treatment of cruise ship passengers
Harassment of cruise ship passengers is another way of de-marketing the port especially
when KPA has intentions to establish a cruise ship hub of Indian Ocean region.  It
appears that the matter was not even attended to, as there was no feed back from the
marketing department.
3.3 Conclusion
However the above-mentioned problems facing Mombasa port do not reflect the mission
statement in the previous chapter hence lack of competitive advantage.  These problems
are not borne and neither can they be solved by KPA alone but require the co-operation
of all the stakeholders.  The analysis in the next chapter portrays the role of other parties
towards these problems and attempts to determine the cause of management being
separated from its clients.
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CHAPTER 4
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
4.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to carry out an in-depth analysis of the problems
discussed in the previous chapter.  The first step will be to analyse the evolution of the
problems over the period under review.  Thereafter, to look at the composition of the
problems in relation to the participants of the meetings, then a study to ascertain the
persistence of these problems.  Finally, to analyse the consequential effects of the
problems for the port and the community.
4.2 Evolution of the problems
During the period under review, the problems related to turn around time had the highest
recorded number of complaints as illustrated in figure 9.
Figure 9.  The Evolution of the Composition of the problems in percentage
               Source: Appendix D
4.2.1 Analysis for 1995
Two meetings were held in the months of May and November respectively.  The year
under review had a total of 17 complaints analysed as follows:
8 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 6 to productivity, 1 to security, and 2
to cost respectively.  There was none for others.
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1.May 1995 meeting
This meeting had a record of 12 complaints analysed as follows:
7 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 4 to productivity and 1 to security
respectively.  The 1st meeting was concluded with a promise to the port users on the
basis of the following:
KPA was to look into issues of documentation procedures, convert berth no 14 for use of
container operations, to rehabilitate the equipment at Mombasa port and ICD Nairobi,
additional land for stacking containers and to issue out turn reports and final bills on
time.
2.November 1995 meeting
This meeting had a record of 5 complaints analysed as follows:
1 complaint pertained to turn around time and 2 to cost respectively.  The remaining 2
complaints, pertained to productivity of the previous meeting.  The 2nd meeting was
concluded on the basis of the following:
KPA was to provide a list of undocumented containers to the customs, a committee was
established to look into documentation procedures, and the issue of storage space at the
CWH would be solved immediately.
4.2.2 Analysis for 1996
Three meetings were held in the months of April, July and November respectively.
Internal environment: a new management team including a managing director had been
appointed.
External environment: KPA was exempted from the State Corporations Act.
The year under review had a record of 24 complaints, an increase by 25 %, analysed as
follows:
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13 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 3 of each to productivity, security,
and cost and 2 to others, respectively.
1.April 1996 meeting
This meeting had a record of 10 complaints analysed as follows:
4 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 1 to productivity, and 1 of each to cost
and others respectively.  The remaining complaints pertained to turn around time of the
previous meeting of May 1995.  The 1st meeting was concluded on the basis of the
following:
Improvement in equipment availability, KPA and KRA to computerise documentation
procedures, there were no immediate plans to convert berth No.14, contracting of
management of container terminal, impose higher punitive charges for the shippers to
curb on dwell time of cargo and to open up a liaison office in Kampala.
2.July 1996 meeting
This meeting had a record of 8 complaints analysed as follows:
2 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 1 to productivity and 2 to security
respectively.  Of the remaining complaints, 2 pertained to turn around time of May 1995
meeting and April 1996 meeting and 1 to cost of April 1996 meeting.  The 2nd meeting
was concluded on the basis of the following:
Satisfactory level of performance had been attained following the ongoing refurbishment
exercise 4th ship to shore gantry crane.  A suitable firm was identified to contract the
management of container terminal.  Need for comprehensive training for KPA security
personnel to discharge their duties satisfactorily.  KPA to adopt container park planning
and tracking system and a liaison officer for Kampala office was appointed.
Restructuring of operations at the motor car section to facilitate quicker delivery of
motor vehicles.  Upgrading of port police to cope with added challenges.  KRA to open
gate No.  18 facilitate flow of container traffic.
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3.November 1996 meeting
This meeting had a record of 6 complaints analysed as follows:
1 of each complaint pertained to turn around time, productivity, security, cost and others
respectively.  The remaining complaint pertained to turn around time of May 1995
meeting.  The 3rd meeting was concluded on the basis of the following:
A team from Felixstowe port was contracted to manage Mombasa container terminal.  A
new KPA head of security services had been appointed.  The security situation at the
port had improved markedly by beefing up security and safe guard cargo.  Port Louis
planning and tracking system was not beneficial to the port.  A task force was set up by
KPA to facilitate processing of claims.  A review to be on documentation system to
facilitate speedy clearance and flow of containers.  KPA received a number of new
trailers being part of an aid package from the Dutch government.
4.2.3 Analysis for 1997
Two meetings were held in the months of September and November respectively.
Internal environment: A new managing director had been appointed.
External environment: The general elections were to be held during the year under
review.
 The year under review had a record of 19 complaints a decrease by –26.3 %, analysed
as follows:
7 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 1 to productivity, 7 to security, 3 to
cost and 1 to others respectively.
1.September 1997 meeting
This meeting had a record of 12 complaints analysed as follows:
1 complaint pertained to turn around time, 4 to security and 2 to cost respectively.  Of
the remaining 5 complaints, 2 pertained to turn around time of May 1995 and 1 of April
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1996 meetings, 1 to security of May 1995 meeting and 1 to cost of November 1995
meeting respectively.  The 1st meeting was concluded on the basis of security measures
undertaken by KPA to reduce cases of theft / pilferage of cargo.
2.November 1997 meeting
This meeting had a record of 7 meetings analysed as follows:
4 of the complaints pertained to turn around time and 1 to security.  The remaining
complaints, 1 of each pertained to security of September 1997 meeting and others of
April 1996 meeting.  The 2nd meeting was concluded that delays experienced during
stripping were set to improve by 1/12/97.
4.2.4 Analysis for 1998
Four meetings were held in the months of May, June, November and December
respectively.  The year under review had a record of 35 complaints an increase by 45.7
%, analysed as follows:
15 complaints pertained to turn around time, 11 to productivity, 6 to security and 3 to
cost.  There was none for others respectively.
1.May 1998 meeting
This meeting had a record of 10 complaints analysed as follows:
2 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 4 to productivity and 4 to security
respectively.  The 1st meeting was concluded on the basis of the following:
KPA was to provide motor vehicle checklist.  KPA to convene a meeting to be attended
by KRC, KPP and KPA internal security on the safety of rail bone cargo.  KPA to
convene a meeting on railtainer delays to be attended by KRC and KRA.  KPA to avail
sufficient gangs in line with operational requirements.  4 reach stackers were in the
process of being acquired.  KRC was in the process of increasing its carriage capacity by
rehabilitating its wagons.
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2.June 1998 meeting
This meeting had a record of 9 complaints analysed as follows:
3 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 2 to productivity and 1 of each to
security and cost.  Of the remaining 2 complaints, 1 of each pertained to productivity of
July 1996 meeting and turn around time of May 1995 meeting.  The 2nd meeting was
concluded on the basis of the following:
KPA was to advertise notices in the media for port users to hasten the clearance of their
cargo from the port.  Port users were advised to bring forward for discussion, only those
issue that could not be effectively discussed in other forums.  The installation of a
watchtower at the G section was complete.  KRC undertook to increase its railing
capacity through additional trains between Mombasa container terminal and ICD's.  KPP
under took to increase police patrols along the dual carriageway.  KRC was to facilitate
the operation of express trains to Uganda.
3.November 1998 meeting
The cause of the time lapse between the previous and the current one was not explained.
However, the meeting had a record of 9 complaints analysed as follows:
4 of the complaints pertained to turn around time and 1 of each to security and cost
respectively.  Of the remaining 3 complaints, 2 pertains to turn around time and 1 to
productivity of May 1995 meeting.  The 3rd meeting was concluded on the basis of the
following:
Watch towers at the G section were still not operational.  The construction of a locker to
cater for storage requirements of motor vehicle keys was not complete.  PAPC meetings
were to be held every 2 months.  KRC are not able to run express trains to Kampala due
to logistic problems.
4.December 1998 meeting
40
This meeting had a record of 7 complaints analysed as follows:
3 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 3 to productivity and 1 to cost
respectively.  The result of the 4th meeting was KPA to look for a stand by generator due
to the break down of computers in Revenue section.
4.2.5 Analysis for 1999
Six meetings were held in the months of March, April, September, October, November
and December 1996 respectively.  The year under review had a record of 41 complaints
an increase by 14.6 %, analysed as follows:
22 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 6 to productivity, 4 to security and 9
to cost.  There was none for others respectively.
1.March 1999 meeting
This was no longer to be a PAPC meeting but was referred to as consultative meeting
with particular reference to the movement of rail borne traffic from the port.  This
meeting had a record of 7 complaints analysed as follows:
3 of the complaints pertained to productivity, 2 to security and 2 to cost respectively.
The 1st meeting was concluded on the basis of the following:
A task force was formed comprising of members from KPA container terminal, KRC,
KSA, KFA, KRA and KPP to fully address and streamline cargo operations pertaining to
the movement of rail borne cargo between the port and Nairobi, Kisumu ICD's and other
hinterland destinations.  A joint marketing task force was formed comprising of
members from KPA, KRC, KRA, KSA and KFA to pursue and come up with
recommendations on how the northern corridor route can be more efficient and
competitive cost wise.  KRA had established an anti theft unit.
2.April 1999 meeting
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This meeting had a record of 5 complaints pertaining to turn around time, but 1
pertained to the meeting of November 1998.  The 2nd meeting was concluded on the
basis of the following: A URC resident representative was to be co-opted into the
marketing task force.  There was an improvement in the railing of cargo from the port
despite insufficient supply of empty wagons, equipment availability, wagon placing,
shunting and documentation.  KRC to commence block train services.
3.September 1999 meeting
This meeting had a record of 10 complaints analysed as follows:
6 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 1 to productivity and 2 to cost.  The
remaining 1 pertained to cost of September 1997 meeting.  The 3rd meeting was
concluded on agreement that a technical committee to be set up comprising of KSA,
KRA, KFA, KPA KRC and URC to come up with a composite rate for cargo destined to
transit countries with an aim of increasing traffic through the northern corridor.
4.October 1999 meeting
Internal environment: A new managing director had been appointed.
This meeting had a record of 7 complaints analysed as follows:
4 of the complaints pertained to turn around time while the remaining 3 complaints, 1 of
each pertained to turn around time of April 1999, security of September 1997 and cost of
September 1999 meetings respectively.  The 4th meeting was concluded on the basis of
the following:
KPA was to set up a fax hotline to receive feed back from port users on services offered
and designate a liaison office to co-ordinate and designate information concerning block
train services between Mombasa and Kampala.  KRC confirmed improvement in block
train services with transit a time of less than 60 hours.
5.November 1999 meeting
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This meeting had a record of 12 complaints analysed as follows:
5 of the complaints pertained to turn around time, 2 to productivity and 2 to cost
respectively.  Of the remaining 3 complaints, 1 of each pertained to turn around time and
cost of September 1999 and security of September 1997.  The 5th meeting was
concluded on the basis of the following:
KPA's fax hot line was operational, and a liaison office had been set up at the terminal
manager's office.  KPA agreed to accept payment of port dues in US dollars.
Improvements on northern corridor as a result of the consultative initiatives were to be
publicised.  The strategy of a joint marketing campaign to visit the transit countries with
aim of sensitising current potential customers of the new developments along the
northern corridor emanating from the port of Mombasa was proposed.  KRC reduces its
tariff rates by 11.4 % and are also responsible for damaged containers transported by
rail, while URC is to review its tariff rates.  Technical sub committee agreed on a
minimum composite rate of US$ 1495 (Mombasa - Kampala) for a 20-ft container going
by rail, including port charges, KRC, URC, THC and delivery order charges.
6.December 1999 meeting
Internal environment: The newly appointed managing director was formally a member
of the joint marketing task force and is well aware of the port users problems.
However, the minutes for this meeting are not available but the author did not record any
complaints from the port users other than improvements on issues pertaining to minutes
of the previous meeting.  The 6th meeting was concluded on the basis of the following:
Review of URC tariff rates was to be carried out in the month of March 2000.
Customers were to be informed in advance of any problem that pertains to railing of
cargo.  The issue of THC is undergoing discussion by inter governmental standing
committee on shipping.  The issue of Kenya Plant Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS) levy
on transit goods was referred to the permanent secretary for discussion with the Minister
for Agriculture.  The joint marketing mission was scheduled early this year.  Port users
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were urged to conduct business on a transparent basis, as it adds value to move goods
through the port.  KPA's managing director was keen on the deplorable state of the port
but assured the customers to manage the port on a customer friendly basis by walking
through the system.
4.3 Composition of the problems
Two major associations, namely the Kenya International Freight and Warehousing
Association and the Kenya Ships Agents Association participate actively in these
meetings.  Apart from these 2 associations state corporations and other individual
companies participate too as illustrated in table 15.
Table 15.  Members of port users meetings.
Code Organisation Code Organisation
KFA Kenya International Freight & UFA Uganda Clearing &Forwarding
Warehousing Association Association
KSA Kenya Ships Agents Association URA Uganda Revenue Authority
KPA Kenya Ports Authority CMT Consultative Meeting of Transit
KRA Kenya Revenue Authority Traffic
KRC Kenya Railways Corporation JMTF Joint Marketing Task Force
KPP Kenya Port Police COs’ Individual companies
URC Uganda Railways Corporation
                                                                                                               Source: Appendix C
4.3.1 Turn around time
Figure 10 is comprised of 83 % of the participants in table 15.  The period under review
had a record of 65 complaints analysed as follows:
In 1995, 5 complaints originated from KFA, 2 from KSA and 1 each from KPA and
KRA respectively.
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                     Figure 10.  The participants for problems related to turn around time
                           Source: Appendix E.
In 1996, the number of complaints raised by KFA increased to 10 while KSA had 3
complaints.  The increase was as a result of the change in the internal environment and 3
meetings were held in the year under review compared to the 2 in the previous year.
In 1997, the number of complaints raised by KFA decreased to 6 and by KSA to 1.  The
decrease was as a result of the time lapse of 9 months before the next meeting was held.
The decrease could have also been caused by change in the internal environment
In 1998, the number of complaints raised by KFA increased to 11 while no complaints
originated from KSA despite their presence.  2 complaints originated from KPA and 1 of
each from KRA and KRC.  The cause of increase was the concern of decline in transit
traffic by-52.6 % in 1997 and -16 % in 1998.
In 1999, there was a wind of change, with the appointment of 2 managing directors in
the year under review.  The meeting was no longer dominated by KFA hence the
decrease of the number of complaints to 2.  The pattern of conducting the meetings
changed with particular reference to movement of transit cargo.  Complaints were either
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to be raised through joint marketing task force or consultative meeting and individual
companies who did not raise complaints on behalf of either KFA or KSA associations.  6
complaints originated from the individual companies, 4 of each from KSA and JMTF, 3
from CMT, 2 from URC and 1 from UFA respectively.
4.3.2 Productivity
Figure 11 is comprised of 41 % of the participants in table 15.  The period under review
had a record of 27 complaints analysed as follows:
In 1995, KFA raised 5 complaints while KSA raised only 1.  In 1996 the number of
complaints raised by KFA decreased to 1, apparently KRC raised 2 complaints.  The
decrease was due to change in the internal environment hence improvement in
equipment availability, refurbishment of ship to shore gantry crane and the aid package
of trailers from Dutch government.
 
Figure 11.  The participants for problems related to productivity
                    Source Appendix E.
In 1997, there was only 1 complaint from KFA.  In 1998, the number of complaints
raised by KFA increased to 8 while 2 complaints originated from KSA and 1 from KRC.
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The concern of frequent break down of equipment and dilapidated infrastructure caused
the increase of complaints.
In 1999, KFA had no complaints but 3 complaints originated from KRC, an increase by
66 %.  The individual companies raised 2 complaints while URC raised 1 complaint.
4.3.3 Security
Figure 12 is comprised of 25 % of the participants in table 15.  The period under review
had a record of 21 complaints analysed as follows:
In 1995, only 1 complaint originated from KFA.  In 1996, the number of complaints
raised by KFA increased to 3.  This was due to change in the internal environment, with
a lot of emphasis on beefing security in the port.
                            Figure 12.  The participants for problems related to security
                           Source: Appendix E.
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In 1997, the number of complaints raised by KFA increased to 4 with 2 complaints
originated from KSA.  The increase was due to the high rate of theft/pilferage
experienced by the users and the general security of the port.
In 1998, the number of complaints raised by KFA remained at 4 and by KSA remained
at 2.  Apparently, the complaints for the year under review did not reflect complaints for
the previous years.
In 1999 the number of complaints raised by KFA and KSA each decreased to 1 while 2
complaints originated from URC.  This is a clear indication of more participation from
Uganda.
4.3.4 Cost
Figure 13 is comprised of 50 % of the participants in table 15.  The year under review
had a record of 20 complaints analysed as follows:
In 1995, only 2 complaints originated from KFA.  In 1996 the number of complaints
raised by KFA were 2 while KSA had 1 complaint.
In the 1997, the number of complaints raised by KFA increased to 3 and in 1998 3
complaints originated also from KFA.
In 1999 due to participation from other companies the number of complaints raised by
KFA decreased to 2.  3 complaints originated from the individual companies and 1 of
each from KSA, KPA, CMT and KPA respectively.
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                  .
Figure 13.  The participants for problems related to cost
                                 Source: Appendix E
4.3.5 Others
Figure 14 is comprised of 8 % of the participants in table 15.  The period under review
had a record of 3 problems from KFA analysed a follows:
The year 1995 had no complaints but there were 2 complaints in 1996 and 1 complaint
in 1997.  No complaints were raised in the years 1998 and 1999 respectively.
 Figure 14.  The participants for problems related to others
                         Source: Appendix E
4.4 Persistence of the problems
Since the meetings were not conducted on a monthly basis, it has been noted that the
concerned authorities neither paid serious attention in solving the problems, nor
0
2 1
0 0
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
KFA
49
responded to them.  Despite the fact that some problems could have re-occurred as
illustrated in the following figures, only some were persistent.
4.4.1 Turn around time
Figure 15 illustrates the persistence of problems pertaining to turn around time.
• Documentation procedures have been persistent for 5 years due to the cumbersome
procedures in KPA, KRA, KRC and URA.  The year 1999 had the highest record
with 68 % of the complaints since the users were keen on the movement of transit
cargo.
• Delay in railing of cargo was mentioned in 1995 and 1996 respectively.  Apparently,
in 1997 the problem was not mentioned.  The poor services on movement of rail
borne transit cargo and undisciplined staff of KRC drew the port users' attention in
1998.  The year 1999 had the highest record of 32 % of the complaints arising from
inefficient services.
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                 Figure 15.  Persistence of problems related to turn around time
                              Source: Appendix F
• Undocumented containers were persistent up to the year 1998, with no solution from
KPA and were not mentioned in 1999.
• The complaints of lack of operational documents were persistent up to the year 1997
with the highest record of 50 % of the complaints in 1996.  This problem may have
ceased as a result of a task force set up by KPA to facilitate quick processing of
claims.
• Stripping delays was mentioned in the 2 meetings of the year 1995.  The problem
was not mentioned in 1996 but re-surfaced in the 2 meetings of the year 1997.  It
was mentioned once again in the 1998 meetings with still no solution from KPA.
• The problem of lack of storage space was only emphasised in the year 1998 when
KPA expressed its concern on the pile up of cargo by urging the port users to
enhance the clearance of cargo from the port.
• Tracing containers was only mentioned once in 1998.
4.4.2 Productivity
           Figure 16.  Persistence of problems related to productivity
                                     Source: Appendix F.
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Figure 16 illustrates the persistence of problems pertaining to productivity.
• The problems pertaining to the port's infrastructure was only mentioned once in 1995
and re-surfaced in 1998 after a lapse of 2 years with a record of 27 % of the
complaints.  Not only the berths were congested but the roads too, with
unserviceable trucks.
• The low availability of equipment was mentioned in 1995 and re-surfaced in 1997.
There was a record of 36 % of the complaints in 1998 due to the poor services at the
container terminal.  Lack of equipment both in KPA and KRC hampered the
movement of transit cargo.
• The persistence of the shortage and laxity of customs officers reached the peak in
1999 with the highest record of 67 %.  The port users encountered a lot of delays at
Malaba the border during railing of transit cargo.
• Shortage of KPA staff was mentioned in the 2 meetings of the year 1995.  After a
lapse of 2 years the problem deteriorated in 1998 due to delays experienced by the
customers and worsened in 1999.
• Poor supply of wagons was mentioned in the 2 meetings of the year 1995 with no
solution from KRC.  There was no solution from KPA to the problem of damaged
wagons by KPA’s equipment mentioned in 1996.  After a lapse of 2 years the
problem deteriorated in 1999 due to the increasing number of sick wagons.
4.4.3 Security
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                         Figure 17.  Persistence of problems related to security
                          Source: Appendix F
Figure 17 illustrates the persistence of problems pertaining to security.  The appalling
port security system has been persistent for the period under review from the year 1996.
The year 1998 had the highest record of 84 % of the complaints.
• The issue of theft on rail borne cargo was curtailed due to the bone of contention on
responsibility between the port police and the port security personnel.
• The port users not only encountered the persistence of excessive checks at the gates
but also at Malaba border.  The year 1999 had the highest record of 50 % of the
complaints.
The authority had no comments on security on dual carriage, as it is not within port
security's reach thus requires the attention of Kenya police.
The problem of police escort was only mentioned in the 2 meetings of the year 1997, its
persistence comprising 33% of the complaints.
4.4.4 Cost
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Figure 18.  Persistence of problems related to cost
                               Source: Appendix F.
Figure 18 illustrates the persistence of problems pertaining to cost.
• Application of new tariff was persistent for the period under review with particular
reference to storage charges, payment of port charges in $ and tariff interpretation.
The year 1998 had the highest record of 100 % of the complaints.
• Terminal handling charges were mentioned in the last 3 meetings for the year 1999
the most affected being the shippers with a record of 33 % of the complaints.
• The penalty charge was imposed in 1995 by KPA as a result of complaints from the
customers to enhance the clearance of containers.  In 1997 the customers wanted the
charge to be withdrawn even though it was never mentioned in the later years.
• Port users, particularly those based in Uganda complained on the imposed KEPHIS
levy on imports in 1997.  However, the problem became a major concern in 1999
when a number of users resorted to diverting their cargo shipments through the
neighbouring port of Dar es Salaam.
• The following problems were only mentioned once on different occasions hence
cannot be termed as persistent.  The cost of shipping documents comprised of 33 %
in 1996, and 11 % in 1999.  Rail tariff and customs overtime charges mentioned
once each comprising of 11 % respectively.
4.4.5 Others
Figure 19 illustrates the persistence of other problems, which were only mentioned, once
with an exception of the issue of telephone booths which caused an uproar in November
1997, as the port users could not bear it any longer.
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                                       Figure 19.  Persistence of problems related to others
                                       Source: Appendix F
4.5 Consequences of the problems
The following conditions have been observed in KPA inconsequent of the analysis:
4.5.1 Decline in transit traffic
Table 2 of dry cargo throughput illustrates that Mombasa port experienced a sharp
decrease of transit traffic by -52.59 % in the year 1997 and -16.14 % in 1998.  About
18.3 % of Mombasa's traffic consists of transit cargo, with Uganda accounting for about
51.9 %.
4.5.2 Loss of Uganda cargo
The volume of Ugandan cargo passing through the port of Dar es salaam is bound to
increase from the current 15,000 tonnes to 30,000 tonnes per month by December 2000,
compared to the tonnage handled in 1996/1997 of 4,000 to 5,000 tonnes on average.
Nkini ( 2000 ).
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Approximately 50 % of the Ugandan coffee exports are now being routed through Dar
es Salaam due to higher rail charges on the Northern Corridor.
4.5.3 Loss of customers
Most importers are now shifting to the ports of Dar es salaam and Durban to avoid
making losses through cargo pilferage.  While some of the Ugandan businessmen
illustrated in Appendix G had resorted to use Dar es Salaam port, others still considered
it to be an alternative port which could not be compared to Mombasa port.
4.5.4 Decline in trade
Trade in Kenya has declined due to frustration of port users by KRA.  This situation has
forced a number of clearing and forwarding firms out of business.
4.5.5 Poor services
The port of Mombasa has lost a lot of Rwandan and Ugandan cargo business to Dar es
Salaam port because of inefficiency in its operations.  With scant attention paid to
customer requirements, the port passes on the high cost of inefficiency to their
customers.
4.6 Summary and conclusion
The above analysis justifies KPA's practice of undemocratic style of management.
Much as KPA tries to justify their actions with promises to the port users, their needs are
ignored as demonstrated in the recurrence of problems.  However, a change was noticed
in October 1999 when the managing director who lasted for 2 months fulfilled his
promise within a month by setting up a fax hot line for the port users and a liaison office
to co-ordinate block train services.  During the period under review, KPA has been faced
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with managerial and operational practices, which could have had direct effects on its
performance.  It is rather difficult for KPA to implement its long-term policies within a
span 5 years under 5 different chief executives and 3 different chairmen.  Decision-
makers were often more responsive to a political or administrative hierarchy than to
market requirements, and thus were interested in non-commercial objectives.  The
remedial actions are to be read in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
The present chapter represents the conclusion of the analysis to the previous chapters,
which identified 5 major problems experienced by the port users by evaluating how
KPA can solve the deficiencies.  Therefore, KPA should identify the problem it should
tackle first, the relationship between the problem and its root causes, by performing a
cost benefit analysis to find out where the probabilities are the biggest.
5.2 Measures
The current developments undertaken by KPA’s management, being measures
introduced by the Kenya government to sustain its competitiveness are its reactions to
the threats posed by the port of Dar es Salaam.  Even though the roles of these measures
are to remove impediments frustrating regional trade, they could be temporary
depending on the circumstances surrounding the external environment.  The following
measures are among the measures introduced to ensure the smooth flow of transit cargo
from the port of Mombasa pertaining to the 5 major problems as follows:
5.2.1 Turn around time
Verification of transit containers, which was previously the main cause of delays in the
clearance of cargo at the port, is now free of charge.  Inspection reports to all cars in
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transit to other countries are now available.  A special window at the KPA revenue
office, has been allocated for processing clearance documents for transit.  Designated
sheds have been identified for the storage and stacking of transit cargo.  Other measures
include the provision of a proper list of items set aside for auction to the relevant
authorities in the transit countries, and removal of security bonds on transit cargo, hence
easing the documentation problem.  The entire shipping community strongly supports
the current management for having undertaken drastic measures to improve operations
and service delivery for Kampala bound transit cargo, which is now done in 2 days from
the previous 28 days.  (Rissik, 2000) 1.
5.2.2 Productivity
The following measures have been undertaken by the authority to enhance its
productivity levels:
• KPA intends to buy new equipment and spare parts worth approximately US$ 20
million to improve cargo-handling services.  (Abele, 2000).  2
• Practically, Ondego, O, the current managing director of KPA is striving to upgrade
the container crane moves from 5 an hour to 10 per hour with an aim to offer clients
15 moves an hour.  (Rissik, 2000).  3
• In addition, the authority's management has set up permanent gangs that are
performing an average of 180 tonnes a day with a set target of 200 tonnes per gang.
(Ogodo, 2000).  4
1,2 and 3 as quoted from an interview given by the Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority
 4 as quoted from the Managing Director's office, Kenya Ports Authority
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5.2.3 Security
KPA plans to enhance the security of goods by fencing off all areas used for container
handling. The authority has intentions of meeting the port users to decide on security
measures, which include ensuring that all cargo deliveries are undertaken by KPA
personnel without interference from clearing and forwarding clerks, and that containers
are stacked door-to-door. There will be a great improvement of escort arrangements for
transit traffic trucks. The symposium held in December 1999 resolved that both URC
and KRC should take insurance policies to cover damage, theft and loss of goods while
in their custody.
5.2.4 Cost
Tariffs are in the process of being simplified and rationalised to be more customer
oriented.  KRC has effected tariff rate reductions for Kampala bound containers by 11 %
to reduce the costs of transiting through the Northern Corridor by rail, and to encourage
more transit traffic to be routed through the port of Mombasa.  Apparently, the rates
applied in Mombasa are still higher compared to those for Dar es Salaam rate 13 %.  The
Kephis levy on cost insurance and freight (CIF) goods, has been reduced from 0.75 %
per cost of importation, to 0.5 %.  In the article, Kenya Ports to replace equipment
(2000), Ondego, O confirms that, “storage charges for empty containers will be reduced
with effect from August this year as an added incentive to its customers.  The 20-ft
containers will be charged at $4 down from $6.50 per day.  The 40 ft container will
charged at $8 from $12 per day.”
5.2.5 Others
KPA has intentions to develop a cruise ship terminal as one of its future business
strategies to maximise income generation, even though the issue of harassment of cruise
ship passengers was not addressed.  Further to the above, Mturi, J (1999), KPA’s non
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executive chairman, indicates that, “the current strategic thinking envisages the port
becoming an industrial distribution centre in its own right, as well as a cruise tourist
destination of international standing.”
However, pressures from the port community on KPA’s management are collateral and
the amount it can solve is often very limited.  Therefore, issues pertaining to customs
tariff and documentation procedures and terminal handling costs charged to shippers can
only be tackled outside KPA’s periphery.  In view of the circumstances, UNCTAD’s
growth package recommends the establishment of a consultative body known as
National Trade and Transport Facilitation Committee (NTTFC) as illustrated in figure
20. (1994,p.8).
Figure 20.  Unctad’s growth package
                                                    Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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for improving the trading environment.  This forum also has the support from the trading
community, that is the users and providers of the transport service whose queries would
be solved immediately, instead of raising them during the port users meetings where the
concerned officers are unable to provide solutions.
5.3 Strategy
A suitable approach for KPA to change the image of the port from an alleged outpost of
corruption and pilferage, into a clean and efficient transport system prerequisite to
benefit the whole economy is to build a strategy.  The fact that the process of building a
strategy may be a long process, therefore it may be a more difficult and lengthy task to
regain the customers that have left the port than to keep the existing ones.  Under such
circumstances, KPA needs to have a strategic plan compatible with its mission and
business plan before it embarks on its marketing trips to identify the exact organisation,
business or person to tackle the issue.  In the absence of a strategic plan, KPA will not
be able to achieve a competitive advantage for the deployment of its existing resources.
Instead of imitating other ports KPA, should adopt a differentiated relation with the
customers to increase its sustainability.  UNCTAD (1992, p.40) indicates that, “in
today’s business world, one of the principles of management is to treat a customer like a
king.”
On going through the analysis in the previous chapter, figure 9 illustrated that the first
problem KPA should tackle is the turn around time followed by productivity.  These 2
problems are compatible in the sense that a shorter turn around time will lead to a higher
productivity, hence the need to solve them simultaneously.  Further more, the
composition of the problems during the period under review revealed that 66 % of the
problems, were raised by KFA, 11 % by KSA, 16 % by individual companies, 3 % by
URC, 2 % by KRC and 1 % each by KPA and KRA respectively.  Indeed, the most
important selling point of for any organisation is to know and remember its customers.
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In order to ensure its success with such an initiative, KPA should focus on the following
questions:
• How does KPA view its customers?
• How does KPA segment its markets?
• How does KPA allocate its resources?
Even though the above analysis illustrates that KPA’s strategic customers, are the
clearing and forwarding firms it does not analyse their individual profitability which can
be apportioned to the ratio of 1:3 in the same manner they have been segmented as
illustrated below:
• 78 % of the companies being members of KFA give KPA 68 % of the total business.
• 2 % of the companies being members of KSA give KPA 27 % of the total business.
• 20 % of the companies being individual companies give KPA 5 % of the total
business.
Therefore, KPA should utilise 100 % of its time on the clearing and forwarding firms as
follows:
• They should be fully attended to by the frontline staff customer service;
• The sales representatives, negotiators, etc should be proactive and not reactive to
competition by utilising 100 % of their time on these customers;
• The management should spend 100 % of its time focussing on their contracts.
5.3.1 Implementation of a Customer relationship management.(CRM)
CRM is a new marketing technique that seeks to establish and maintain individualised
relations with customers in order to enhance loyalty and retention.  This technique is a
key business measure to understand the historical behaviour of customers, their
preferences and complaints and to identify the important ones.  However, CRM requires
a transformation of KPA, which is not easy, unless it has a strong information
technology (IT) capability in place.  The use of IT will enhance KPA to stay abreast of
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its customers’ concerns and make timely and appropriate response to the customers’
calls.  Francou, B (1999), states that, “information is the key of the efficiency for all the
partners of the logistic chain.” In the light of the above, KPA’s biggest challenge is to
solve the cumbersome documentation procedures being the major stumbling block
resulting to longer turn around time.  Reynolds T, (1999) of the Port of Le havre in
France recommends that, it is more economical to improve procedures rather than to
undertake huge financial operations to build quays, storage areas and warehouses solely
because the present installations are saturated by the incapacity of the port system.  If the
goods were cleared more quickly from the storage areas and warehouses, the same
installations could probably handle twice as much cargo.
Figure 21.  Terminal operating management system
                                   Source: Cargo Service Aarhus A/S
Service
Providers
Customs
Ship
Operating
Agents
Port
Authorities
Port
Information
Center
EDI Connection
Trucking
Company
Tally
Company
Rail
Authorities
Local
Liner
Agents
Container
Terminals Administra
tion
65
KPA’s wheel of success is to institute a port information centre or rather initiate a
multimodal system similar to the one at the port of Aarhus in Denmark as illustrated in
Figure 21 at a cost of US$ 0.2 million comprising of the software, equipment and
training.  However, the major port users being KFA and KSA, are bound to benefit from
this system based on the following analysis:
5.3.1.1 Turn around time
The analysis in the previous chapter proves that delaying a large ship is a tremendous
expense for the shipping industry.  For instance incase of a shipping agency engaging
the services of his ship to ply the Mombasa – Durban route with a capacity of 100 TEUS
per sailing with a transit time of 5 days; the freight earned is US$600 per TEU at a profit
of US$50 per TEU.  The turn around time in Durban port is assumed to be the standard
of 2 days.  The frequency is 4 calls a month that is 1 weekly call.
Table 16.  Comparison of ships’ turn around time
Current Standard
Mombasa port 5 days 2 days
Sailing 5 days 5 days
Durban port 2 days 2 days
Sailing 5 days 5 days
Mombasa port 5 days 2 days
Sailing 5 days 5 days
Durban port 2 days 2 days
Sailing 5 days
Mombasa port 2 days
Total 29 days 30 days
                                                                                                           Source: Shipping agency services.
The analysis in table 16 indicates that currently, it takes the port of Mombasa
approximately 4- 5 days to turn the ship around compared to the standard time of 2 days;
66
therefore the ship can only call the port twice a month at a profit of US$ 40,000 per
month.  Therefore, a shorter turn around time which greatly depends on productivity
would enable the ship to make the 4 calls at a profit of US $ 80,000 per month, taking
into consideration the number of TEUS is relatively small, hence the ship can sail the
same day it calls.  The above scenario would not only encourage this particular shipping
agent to engage more ships on this route but the frequency of other shipping companies
who are approximately 25 in number to use the port will definitely increase.  Under this
system, there would be no room for poor planning resulting to berthing delays suffered
by the shipping industry due to congestion as illustrated in Appendix B amounting to
losses worth US$ 25,000 per ship call.
Prior to the decline in trade as a result of customers shifting to the neighbouring ports
the major clearing and forwarding firms could handle approximately 150 containers per
week on a regular basis, but now some of them handle even less than 10 containers.
Therefore improvement in documentation procedures will make a company clearing 100
(20’) containers earn US$ 36,000 per month in the form of commission as opposed to a
commission of US$ 1,800 when only 5 (20’) containers are cleared.  With KRC soon
leasing its facilities on concession, the transit time for transiting through the Northern
Corridor will be maintained.  The skyrocket charges of US$ 3,200 for local containers
and US$4,200 for transit containers being charged by the shipping agents as container
deposits will be reduced to the original charge of US$1,000.  The analysis in Table 17
clearly shows the losses these firms have incurred due to inefficiency in Mombasa port
thus forcing them to reduce their costs considerably.  However, in the article, Kenya
Ports to replace equipment (2000), Ondego, O confirms that, “improved efficiency will
save importers and exporters an estimated US$300 per 20ft container.”
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Table 17.  Clearing and forwarding agents (CFA) charges in Kenya
US $ 20' US $ 40'
KPA shore handling charges 150 180
Terminal handling charges 70 80
Verification 75 150
Govt., taxes, duties, VAT, survey at cost at cost
Delivery order fee / B/L 35 35
Customs/port documentation per B/L 40 40
Agency, doc / handling 90 105
                                                                                                                    Source: Rates from CFA in Kenya, 1999.
5.3.1.2 Productivity
This system focuses on equipment with low investment and maintenance costs a higher
quality of services and improved productivity.  Figure 7 illustrates that the average
container movements for the port of Antwerp in 1991 were 206 per shift.  With the same
type of equipment they have achieved a higher productivity of 240 moves per shift and
the number of containers have doubled as a result of stacking 3 high.  The number of
container moves is an important factor for shipping lines.  With proper maintenance
KPA’s 4 Reach stackers acquired early last year at an approximate cost of US$ 1.2
million can achieve the above productivity.  Losses suffered by the shipping industry
due to gantry breakdowns and poor tugmaster availability amounting to approximately
US$ 0.15 million per month as illustrated in Appendix K will be reduced.  Toubhans,
(1999) of the port of Le Havre confirms that, “failure to maintain equipment in good
working order can lead to low availability, low productivity and performance, additional
investment, additional operating costs and low competitiveness of the port.” With lower
maintenance costs, KPA’s expenditure on maintenance is not likely to exceed 3 % of the
budgeted volume of business.  On the basis of the above factors, KPA may not need to
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invest in an extra terminal but expand into a big port to achieve economies of scale thus
attracting more cargo and ships.
Despite KPA’s large workforce of 7000 employees, this system warrants the authority to
invest approximately a minimum of US$ 0.08 million on training.  The essence of
training and the crucial elements for KPA to consider in implementing the CRM strategy
to reach its goal or mission should be focused on quality, market, technology including
IT, finance and human resources.  Well-trained staff including the professionals will
work well together towards the common goal of improved efficiency and therefore
achieve UNCTAD’s recommended productivity of 640 tonnes a day with better results
of increased cargo volume as illustrated in table 1 thus contributing to the success of the
port.  The rate of accidents will be minimal due to enhancement of KPA's supervisory
capabilities both at the equipment maintenance and cargo handling operations.
5.3.1.3 Security
KPA’s annual expenditure of US$ 0.5million on goods theft will reduce since all parties
are in possession of advance information pertaining to cargo, which can easily be
monitored upon landing.  Since the information from the port information centre can be
sold to other parties, the question of slow processing or lack of documents pertaining to
claims should not arise.  The port information centre ensures high data security and the
assurance that it is available.  Cargo surveillance can be done by investing in a similar
security system used in Malmö oil port comprising a minimum of 3 video cameras,
including a recorder at a cost of US$ 7,800.  Priority should be given to transit cargo that
can be consolidated and stored in one shed, as opposed to storage in various sheds.
5.3.1.4 Cost
KPA’s port information centre will have an electronic data interchange (EDI) link
connecting its billing system, with the payment processing system of the shipping agents
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and major clearing and forwarding companies.  The introduction of an EDI connection
for invoicing will in turn enable the customers to enhance their payment processing
workflow.  The link will in turn enable KPA to process documents faster and reduce its
monthly overtime costs of US$ 0.5 million and increase efficiency as invoices and
detailed transaction records will be sent directly to the customers’ computer systems.
5.3.1.5 Others
The EDI system will ease the customers’ problems in communicating with other parties,
since they will be on line and the concerned parties can always attend to their queries.
The customers’ savings on cost will be incorporated in the turn around time costs.
5.3.2 CRM analysis
However, the CRM model can as well be initiated at ICD Kisumu as it is capable of
identifying its potential customers from the total number of 56 customers' today.  In
order to be effective in implementing a CRM strategy the following dimensions of CRM
should be considered:
• Classify the customers in terms of cargo volume and distribution;
• Classify the customers on the basis of the life span of their companies;
• How recent KPA's services the customers have used;
• The importance of KPA's services to the customers;
• The idea is to have the above analysis on line.
Once the port of Mombasa can identify 5 % its top customers the same format
recommended for identifying ICD Kisumu’s customers by using the previous years'
cargo traffic figures illustrated in Appendices H and J should apply.  Figure 22 illustrates
that Foam Mattress and Prafulla Enterprises including transit traffic being clearing and
forwarding agents have been using the depot since its inception in 1994.  These
customers warrant 100 % of KPA’s attention.  Figure 23 illustrates that Mackenzie
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Maritime, a shipping agent’s representative and an exporter should get 100 % of KPA’s
attention not forgetting Transami a potential exporter, while Kenfreight dealing with
both imports and exports have made use of the depot since 1998, hence the need to be
attended to as well.
                    Figure 22.  ICD Kisumu importers.
                        Source: Appendix H
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                        Figure 23.  ICD Kisumu exporters
                              Source: Appendix H
The art of selling is for KPA to be in the customers’ shoes in the sense that KPA is the
first person a customer calls.  In view of the above KPA can then prioritise its efforts to
improve its relationship with these customers on the basis of the following:
• Call them and say "hello" and make sure they are happy with KPA’s services and
make them know every single detail of the company intimately;
• Have everyone of the senior managers send out one hand written thank you note a
week to KPA's most valuable customers;
• KPA should ask its valuable customers what they could differently to improve its
services;
• KPA must comply with what customers suggest, follow up, and do it again.
KPA should find out if any customers have complained about its services more than
once in the past year and continue to baby-sit their orders in the future.  Call them back
and check on their progress, and put a product or quality person in touch with them.
KPA should increase its share of customers from firms who use the port every once in a
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while, such as Maseno and Kenuga who are importers and have used the depot once in
1998 and 1999 respectively.  Make a compelling offer to them to try several other
services the organisation offers.  Or, find those customers who cost the organisation
money and implement measures to cut costs with these customers through direct
marketing by guiding them to a different business channel, which is the internet.
Alternatively, they are referred to a well-known freight forwarder.  The internet option is
to get away the sale focus from these customer.
5.3.2.1 Human behaviour
Human behaviour is critical to the successful implementation of a CRM strategy.
Communicating change to all port employees is important and should be involved in the
following changes:
• Priority should be given to the individuals who will be affected by the change
involved from the inception of the project.  Tell them about the initiative, what KPA
is expecting to accomplish from the change, how the customer will be affected, and,
most importantly, how the change will affect their work.  Ask for their input into the
project, not only at the beginning, but also through out the project.
• Communicate regularly, with appropriate messages and provide an easy way for
employees to voice comments.
5.3.2.2 Benefits
The benefits of CRM would enable KPA to determine exactly who its important
customers are, and to develop integrated marketing data bases that would help the
organisation to know them better and in turn improve its bottom line.  In this regard, the
marketing manager would be able to detect whether the operational complaints have
been solved or not.  The employees should have access information and processes to
know about their customers, the ability to understand their needs, and efficiently build
relationships between the organisation, its customer base and distribution partners.
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However, Ma (2000) comments that, “ the organisation should not try to accomplish
everything overnight.  If it is unable to provide the service then CRM service is
undermined based on that the organisation can create good relationship with the
customers.”
5.4 Establish joint operating companies
KPA is of the view that in future there would be less concentration on conventional
cargo, as most of the services would be commercialised therefore its main focus is on
expanding the container terminal.  In view of the above as an alternative, KPA needs to
involve the role of private operator in its operations in order to improve efficiency and to
obtain greater loyalty from the port users.
It should be noted that a 2-year contract signed by KPA and the port of Felixstowe in
1996 to run the Mombasa container terminal was terminated prematurely on KPA’s
failure to provide adequate equipment and spare parts.  However, with the reorganisation
of KPA’s management, its current elite cadre could encourage the idea of operating the
container terminal as a joint venture concession arrangement, probably on a revenue
sharing basis with a strategic partner to perform the stevedoring services.  The success of
port of Aarhus and Malta Freeport Corporation evidences the involvement of private
operators’ leading to higher productivity, and expansion levels as well as a reduction of
costs.
Similarly, the shipping industry will benefit from the services of a private operator who
is also capable of instituting a port information centre at the container terminal.  The
private operator can easily tackle the 5 major problems experienced by the customers
pertaining to turn around time and productivity based on analysis in tables 16 and 17
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respectively.  KPA would remain responsible for the remaining problems pertaining to
security, cost and others to be recommended in the next chapter.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter concludes the final part of the analysis of the problems pertaining to the
port users, the measures and the proposed actions to be undertaken by KPA’s
management.  The outcome of the proposals has revealed that benefits to be accrued by
all concerned parties in the long run outweigh the costs to be incurred by KPA.
However, Sunguh, G (1999) comments that, “in order to give the port of Mombasa a
new life, Kenya should borrow a leaf from the Dubai Ports Authority (DPA) – the
world’s fastest growing port.”
The next chapter will give some recommendations with the biggest probabilities for
KPA to implement and the conclusions of the research.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Successful customer ownership is the key line to the interface between the port and the
customers, as it will create a competitive advantage and result in improved customer
retention and profitability.  Therefore, KPA’s success can only be assessed based on the
value created and delivered to its customers.  Otherwise, the authority would have
neither legitimate reason to exist nor the ability to accomplish its corporate objectives.
Furthermore, the customer relationship management strategy would prove an
exceptional marketing technique that would enable KPA react to business competition
promptly.
6.1 Results
The 2 proposals identified to resolve the 5 major problems experienced by KPA’s
customers not only emphasised on the ports need to achieve efficiency, but also focussed
on sustainable relationships with the customers.  The cost benefit analysis in the
previous chapter revealed that losses suffered by the shipping industry are mainly
incurred due to the problems pertaining to turn around time.  In view of the above KPA
should first tackle the problems based on the following findings:
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6.1.1 Turn around time
KPA can easily solve the problems pertaining to turn around time if it implements the
CRM as a viable means of integrating and co-ordinating all the activities of the
organisation by instigating a clear focus to all departments within KPA.  This system is
beneficial to the custom officers in order to perform risk analysis as practised in the
Swedish ports.  One of its critical success factors is the re-use of information that would
save money, time and eliminate human errors for the authority.  Despite the facts that the
private operator can also institute a port information centre, his services are only
concentrated on the operational activities.
6.1.2 Productivity
Much as the need for new equipment is a priority for the port of Mombasa, acquisition
for the same from overseas may be hampered by the current procedures through the
Central Bank, which are long and cumbersome.  Therefore, KPA can still solve the
problems pertaining to productivity by adopting the CRM especially by training its
employees and also engaging the services of a private operator to handle the equipment
issues who will not have to rely on government mechanisms to make decisions.
6.1.3 Security
Despite the high rate of cargo theft in the port, privatising security services might not be
effective since KPA has to maintain the KPP division for reasons of national security.
However, CRM is ideal, as it will enhance the quick clearance of cargo from the port
thus limiting the chances of pilferage.
6.1.4 Cost
The role of the private operator is to negotiate competitive prices with KPA.  KPA will
have the opportunity to co-operate with the port of Dar es Salaam since they share the
same hinterland and avoid offering dumping prices to the customers.  Beth (2000, 37)
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shares similar sentiments that, “there is no competitive situation between the ports
handling the same cargo and customers are identical.” CRM will take care of
documentation problems encountered by the customers due to ignorance.
6.1.5 Others
KPA will have an in depth knowledge of its customers through the application of CRM.
In the words of Olsson (2000) “getting the market share in the transport economy is not
as difficult as getting the customers but recommends interaction and socialising with
customers to make good use of them where value can be added to the industry.”
6.2 Recommendations
With regard to the above conclusion and findings, the following recommendations have
been made for KPA’s management to adopt the CRM strategy.
6.2.1 Objective
• KPA should focus on a system, which can contain all activities pertaining to the
port to make it earn money and remain competitive, boost productivity and can
provide a number of services to the customers.
6.2.2 Resources required
• The chief executive should ensure the involvement of top management by
appointing a senior, committed and charismatic manager/leader probably his
personal assistant to initiate the CRM strategy and to ensure its successful
implementation across KPA.
• KPA should seriously consider the customers’ interests by linking them to its
computer system, with the other stakeholders involved in stevedoring and
transport services and ensuring that the information is limited to each individual,
78
which can also be sold to other parties. It should also maintain standardised
procedures by acquiring the right handling equipment.
• The human resources division should prepare and provide sufficient training
packages especially for those who deal with customers directly, giving the
employees the skills necessary to fit in the new systems and processes KPA will
be implementing.  It should also develop the training programmes and make a
follow up based on the following questions:
• What does KPA intend to achieve?
• What are the results of the achievement?
• What are the causes of non-achievement?
• What does KPA intend to do for the future?
The CRM strategy is not an instant action but it is meant to be an ongoing and constant
process, therefore actions to be implemented in the short, medium and long term are
recommended as follows:
6.2.3 Short term
• KPA should consider signing performance guarantee contracts with government
security agencies deployed at the port, which would make them accountable for
cargo stolen in their watch.
• The number of Agriculture Society of Kenya (ASK) shows should be reduced to
probably one and instead have the chance be utilised by the chief executive under
the guidance of the marketing manager to visit the customers based in the
hinterland.  KPA should encourage its participation in trade fairs.
• The responsibility for understanding customers and contributing to the delivery
of value to them should be charged to all KPA members of staff rather than to
marketing department only.
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• The marketing department should set a competitive tariff for the private operator,
reflecting market prices comparable to the invisible costs related to ships time in
port and the invisible costs related to the disbursements linked to it.  The level of
tariff should be compatible to the level of services offered to the customers.  The
marketing manager should be free to meet the customers at least once a year to
negotiate prices probably offer tariff rebates on special cases.
6.2.4 Medium –long term
• KPA should consider the crucial elements to implement the CRM strategy to
reach its goal or mission by focussing on quality, market, and technology
including IT, finance and human resources by participating in extensive use of
the IT, programmes and maintaining quality management that will earn the port
the following advantages:
• every one follows the same system;
• improves efficiency;
• customers demand quality;
• fewer customer complaints;
• marketing benefits are constant services;
• greater staff involvement.
• Quality should be in the eyes of the customer to see KPA as a
• S – simple
• M – measurable
• A – achievable
• R – reasonable
• T – target oriented organisation.
• Since the port of Mombasa has a potential market to become a cruise hub, which
would create value added for the economy, the marketing department should
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strive to either outsource the research on clients’ demands as in the case of
Valleta port in Malta, or subscribe G.P.  Wild magazines.  Alternatively the ports
of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam can co-operate since they have the same strategy
of cruise lining to find out what each port intends to offer its clients.
• The finance division should ensure that KPA is financially sound to invest in a
system with reasonable payback period with sufficient number of computers to
be used in implementing the CRM strategy.
6.2.5 Expected outcome
• The implementation of the CRM strategy, is the exclusive prerogative of KPA’s
management to eliminate superficial documentation, non-committed workforce,
management without authority, poor documentation control and poor internal
audit procedures.  Therefore, the cost of replenishment as a result of loses of
customers through lack of attention and indifferent servicing is high, thus CRM
strategy has a responsibility to account for that investment.
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APPENDIX A
The map indicates where the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are situated and the
common hinterland.
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
Minutes of the port users meetings G5
Time Code 1 Problem Code2 KFA KSA KPA KRC KRA JMTF URC CMT UFA Cos KFA KRC KSA URC Cos KFA KSA URC KFA KSA KPA CMT KRA Cos KFA          Organization
18.5.95 UC Undocumented containers G1 1  Kenya freight  Assc
RL Railage of ICD Nrb boxes G1 1  Kenya freight  Assc
LS Clearance of copper yard G1 1  Kenya freight  Assc
OD  Delay in out turn reports G1 1  Kenya freight  Assc
SL Shortage of labour G2 1 Kenya freight Assc
LAE Low equipment availability G2 1  Kenya freight  Assc
SW Supply of wagons G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
RC Theft on rail borne cargo G3 1 Kenya freight Assc
DP Forged MPRO's and C10's G1 1  Kenya freight Assc
SD Request for age analysis-L.C.L boxes G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
PF Insufficient berths plans G2 1 Kenya ship Assc
SD Lack of export boxes G1 1 Kenya ship  Assc
2.11.95 UC Request for list of undocumented conts. G1 1 Kenya Revenue Auth
PC Higher penalty-uncleared containers G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SL Poor planning on labour G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SW Supply of wagons G2 1 Kenya Railways Corp
ANT Improper  application of new tariff G4 1 Kenya freight Assc
23.4.96 RL Railage of ICD Nrb boxes G1 1 Kenya shipAssc
DP Delay in verification G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
UC List of undocumented containers G1 1 Kenya Ports Auth
OD Issue of motor vehicle inspect report G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
DP Delays at the cash office KRA G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
DP Request for a dedicated motor cycle G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
ANT LDC for South Africa imp. G4 1  Kenya Freight  Assc 
OD
Delay in issuance of out-turn interchange 
reports & loading tallies. G1 Kenya freight Assc
SW Damage to wagons-KPA equipment G2 1 Uganda Railways Corp
TB Lack of telephone booths G5 1 Kenya freight  Assc
GROUP 4GROUP 3GROUP 2GROUP 1
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30.7.96 PS Theft of motor vehicle items G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
OD Delay to obtain inspection reports G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
ANT LDC for South Africa imp. G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
CK Misplacement of car keys G2 1 Kenya  freight Assc
OD Late delivery of out-turn G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
EC Excessive checks by Police G3 1 Kenya freight Assc
DP Forged delivery orders G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
OD Delay to act on claims G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
7.11.96 PS KPA drivers party to theft G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
CSD Cost of hologram-for shipping doc G4 1 Kenya ship Assc
RL Staff in KRA lack discipline G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
HCP Harassment of cruise ship passengers G5 1 Kenya freight  Assc
OD No Improvement for out turn reports G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
RF Request to upgrade reefer facilities G2 1 Kenya Railwasys Corp
22.9.97 OD Delayto get motorvehicle inspection. G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
OD Claim process is slow G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
SDC Security on dual carriage G3 1 Kenya freight Assc
PS Security at the port G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
LAE Frequent breakdown-equipment G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SD Delays in stripping G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
RC Theft on rail borne cargo G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
ANT Double charges on rent G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
KL KARI levy on imports G4 1 UgandA freight Assc
PC Withdraw Punitive charges G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
PE Delays by Port police-escort G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
EC Excessive checks G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
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28.11.97 DP Reallocation of G-section offices. G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
PE Delay in escort of transit G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
DP Slow process of railage doc. G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
UC Dwell time analysis request G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SD Stripping delays requested G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
PS Fund to repair marine crafts G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
TB Insufficient telephones G5 1 Kenya freight  Assc
4.5.98 LAE Lack of low bed trailers G2 1 Kenya ship Assc
PS Port prone to piracy G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
PS Closure of gate No 20 G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
SDC Ambush of loaded trucks G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
LAE Poor services at the terminal G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
PS Constriain in  cargo movement G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
DP Delay to deliver blue copy G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
DP Harmonise working hours G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SL Delay in change in shift G2 1 Kenya Railways Corp
PF Frequent break downs of trucks G2 1 Kenya freight Assc
4.6.98 CK Handling of car keys G2 1 Kenya freight Assc
PF Trucks scout for business G2 1 Kenya ship  Assc
PF Widen the fly over G2 1 Kenya freight Assc
LS Pile up of cargo G1 1 Kenya Ports Auth
UC Undocumented containers G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
LS Advertise customs auctions G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
RL Possibility of accidents-port users cars G1 1 Kenya Railways Corp
ANT Invoices not the true picture - VAT G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
PS Security attacked at night G3 1  Kenya freight  Assc
GROUP 4GROUP 3GROUP 2GROUP 1
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24.11.98 PS Different seal upon arrival G3 1 Kenya freight  Assc
LAE Low availability of equipment G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
UC Undocumented conts.to be analysed G1 1  Kenya freight  Assc
LS Transfer conts. to CWH G1 1 Kenya Revenue Auth
LS Selective-conts.to transfer G1 1 Kenya Ports Auth
DP Interference by SWIPCO G1 1 Kenya freight  Ass
RL Delay of loaded wagons G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
ANT Interpret-clause 16-tariff G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
SD Request for stipping tally G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
21.12.98 DP Delays at long room KRA G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
ANT Pay port dues in US-bank G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
TC Problem in tracing containers G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
CO Conts.sealed different custom officer G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
DP Loading tally-KPA unsigned by KRC G1 1 Kenya freight Assc
CO Lack of custom sealing clerks G2 1 Kenya freight Assc
LAE Lack of break vans G2 1 Kenya freight  Assc
5.3.99 PS Laxity in port security G3 1 Kenya ship Assc
ANT Tariffs & Doc/Clearance G4 1 Kenya ship Assc
SL Laxity in KPA workers G2 1 Cos - dedicated-Wgs
SW Increasing Nos-sick wagons G2 1 Del monte
CO Unavailability-custom officer G2 1 Kenya Railways Corp
RC Theft cases -increase G3 1 Kenya freight Assc
CSD Delivery order charges-high G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
9.4.99 DP Delay to process C35 G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
DP Delay in rail documentation G1 1 Joint market task force 
RL Railways to designate specific days G1 1 Joint market task force 
RL Advertise rail service G1 1 Joint market task force 
DP Delays caused by SWIPCO G1 1 Joint market task force 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
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3.9.99 DP Delay at  border-change of load post G1 1 Uganda Railways Corp
RL Diversion-different exit-pts G1 1 Afro-freifght forwarders 
CO Officers avail on sundays G2 1 Uganda Railways Corp
RT High rail tariff N / Corridor G4 1 Mediterranean Co
RL Irregular rail schedules G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
DP Manifest to have final destination G1 1 Consult meeting
THC High terminal handling charges G4 1 Kenya Ports Auth
DP Documentation procedures transit G1 1 Consultative meeting
KL Levy discourged-customers G4 1 Consultative meeting
DP Delays in service points G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
1.10.99 RL Advertise rail service G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
DP Desks to capture data-transit G1 1 Afro freight  Ltd
RL Requirements-URA G1 1 Uganda freight Assc
EC Lengthy commodity checks G3 1 Uganda Railways Corp
RL Change from Malaba route to Tororo G1 1 Transami Kenya Ltd
DP Request for more photo copies-C632 G1 1 Transami Kenya Ltd
THC Charges high than Dar port G4 1 Kenya Revenue Auth
5.11.99 CO Delay slow KRA personnel G2 1 Kenya Railways Corp
CO  Lack of KRA personnel G2 1 Kenya Railways Corp
COC High overtime cost-Ug.exp G4 1 Coffeecare Kenya Ltd
DP Final destination included in manifest G1 1 Kenya ship Assc
THC Additional cost for port users G4 1 Kenya freight  Assc
DP Malaba-lack of generator G1 1 Coffeecare Kenya Ltd
EC Mandatory  checks G3 1 Uganda Railways Corp
DP Causing delays form C634 G1 1 Consultative meeting
ANT Port dues in US-Kampala G4 1 Coffeecare Kenya Ltd
DP Lodge entries at KPA G1 1 Rakai Clearing Ltd
DP Delay to cancel bonds G1 1 Uganda Railways Corp
DP Delay to apply 2nd extension for transit G1 1 Kenya freight  Assc
GROUP 4GROUP 3GROUP 2GROUP 1
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APPENDIX D
The composition of customers problems
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
time 8 13 7 15 22 65
productivity 6 3 1 11 6 27
security 1 3 7 6 4 21
cost 2 3 3 3 9 20
others 0 2 1 0 0 3
17 24 19 35 41 136
The above figures have been derived from Appendix C in which the problems are
divided in 5 major groups.  Figure 9 has been derived from the above table showing the
evolution of the problems which clearly shows that majority of the problems pertains to
turn around time, followed by productivity being the major stumbling block for KPA’s
operations.
91
APPENDIX E
The composition of the complainants
time 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
KFA 5 10 6 11 2 34
KSA 2 2 1 0 4 9
KPA 1 0 0 2 0 3
KRC 0 0 0 1 0 1
KRA 1 0 0 1 0 2
JMTF 0 0 0 0 4 4
URC 0 0 0 0 2 2
CMT 0 0 0 0 3 3
UFA 0 0 0 0 1 1
Cos 0 0 0 0 6 6
productivity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
KFA 5 1 1 8 0 15
KSA 1 0 0 2 0 3
KPA 0 0 0 0 0 0
KRC 0 2 0 1 3 6
KRA 0 0 0 0 0 0
JMTF 0 0 0 0 0 0
URC 0 0 0 0 1 1
CMT 0 0 0 0 0 0
UFA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cos 0 0 0 0 2 2
security 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
KFA 1 3 4 4 1 13
KSA 0 0 3 2 1 6
KPA 0 0 0 0 0 0
KRC 0 0 0 0 0 0
KRA 0 0 0 0 0 0
JMTF 0 0 0 0 0 0
URC 0 0 0 0 2 2
CMT 0 0 0 0 0 0
UFA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cos 0 0 0 0 0 0
cost 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
KFA 2 2 3 3 2 12
KSA 0 1 0 0 1 2
KPA 0 0 0 0 1 1
KRC 0 0 0 0 0 0
KRA 0 0 0 0 1 1
JMTF 0 0 0 0 0 0
URC 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMT 0 0 0 0 1 1
UFA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cos 0 0 0 0 3 3
others 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
KFA 0 2 1 0 0 3
Figures 10 to 14 have been derived from the above table, which illustrates that KFA and
KSA, are the major complainants apart from the year 1999.
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APPENDIX F
The persistence of the problems
Time UC RL DP OD SD LS TC
1995 2 2 1 1 2 1 0
1996 1 1 4 6 0 0 0
1997 1 0 2 2 2 0 0
1998 2 2 5 0 1 4 1
1999 0 7 15 0 0 2 0
6 12 27 9 5 7 1
Productivity PF SL CK LAE RF SW CO
1995 1 2 0 1 0 2 0
1996 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1997 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1998 3 1 1 4 0 0 2
1999 0 1 0 0 0 1 4
4 4 2 6 1 4 6
Cost PC ANT KL THC CSD RT COC
1995 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
1997 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1998 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 2 1 3 1 1 1
2 9 2 3 2 1 1
Security RC PS EC SDC PE
1995 1 0 0 0 0
1996 0 2 1 0 0
1997 1 2 1 1 2
1998 0 5 0 1 0
1999 0 2 2 0 0
2 11 4 2 2
Others HCP TB
1995 0 0
1996 1 1
1997 0 1
1998 0 0
1999 0 0
1 2
Figures 15 to 19 are derived from the above table, which illustrates the persistence in the
5 major groups of problems.
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APPENDIX G
KPA'S 10 MAJOR CUSTOMERS BASED IN UGANDA
1.IMPORTERS
• MUKWANO INDUSTRIES
• ROOFINGS LTD
• INTERFREIGHT
• HOUSE OF DAWDA
• ALAM GROUP OF COMPANIES
2.EXPORTERS
• PANALPINA
• UGACOF LTD. COFFEE EXPORTERS
• OLAM UGANDA
• NSAMBA COFFEE WORKS
• TRANSAMI
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APPENDIX H
ICD Kisumu’s potential importers
IMPORTS 1994-1999 Revenue
No Firm Commodity Tonnage  in US$
1 Foam Mattress Ltd Polyol 5750 46045
Toluene 3450 24387
Printed fabric 2300 16258
Vegtable oil 1359 9606
Reel paper 1150 8129
Rice 644 4552
2 Prafulla Enteprises Ltd Clear float glass 5640 28105
Sewerage fitting 2300 11117
Agricultural machinery 230 1149
Prafulla Enterprises Ltd(Transit) General merchandise 2465 11169
Motor vehicle parts 345 2702
Clear float glass 735 1278
Vegetable oil 414 849
White refined sugar 506 756
3 Kenfreight (E.A) Ltd Bitumen 920 4935
Clera float glass 782 2949
Disk brake pad 690 2922
4 Kened International Ltd General merchandise 995 4394
Used clothing 46 254
Bicycle tyres 46 242
5 Best Crystals General merchandise 449 1964
Unassembled bicycles 92 457
Motor vehicle spares 69 334
Automobile batteries 23 122
6 Ksm Banco Manufacturers Zinc coated 188 834
Roofing nail 150 716
Ox-plough wheel 92 390
7 Chemhard Agencies Caustic soda 161 916
Non ferric Aluminium 153 551
Stable bleaching powder 92 368
8 Capricorn Trading Co Aluminium sulphate 276 1044
Vegetable oil 184 645
Phosphoric Acid 163 727
9 Rift Valley Product Ltd(transit) General merchandise 230 1658
10 Bingo Sweets Ltd Raw material for gums 159 477
Food processing mach. 46 333
11 Kenuga Enterprises (transit) Medicated cream soap 290 1310
12 Maseno Hospital Hospital equipment 46 660
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APPENDIX J
ICD Kisumu’s potential exporters
EXPORTS 1994-1999
1 Mackenzie Maritime Ltd
(transit
Coffee 5750 16234
Bales of cotton 4140 11688
Tobacco 3450 9740
Hides 851 2403
Coffee 3963 10543
2 Transami Tobacco 552 860
3 Kenfreight (E.A) Ltd Coffee 1834 649
Importers frequency in using ICD Kisumu
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Foam Mattress 18 58 42 43 52 49 262
PrafullaEnterprise 0 30 45 84 60 53 274
Kenfreight 0 0 0 0 13 21 34
Kened International 0 0 19 4 1 9 33
Best crystals 0 22 4 0 0 0 26
Kisumu Banco 0 0 0 5 4 3 12
Chemhard Agencies 0 2 8 0 1 0 11
Capricorn Trading 3 4 0 0 0 0 7
Rift Valley 0 0 2 2 1 0 5
Bingo Sweets 0 3 2 0 0 0 5
Kenuga 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Maseno Hospital 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
 Figure 22 has been derived from the above table
Exporters frequency in using ICD Kisumu
Mackenzie maritime 0 0 14 9 7 131 161
Transami 0 0 0 0 46 20 66
Kenfreight 0 0 0 0 40 22 62
Figure 23 has been derived from the above table.
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